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A Tale of Two Practitioners: Exploring the Indonesian Model of Decentralization and 
Development, post-Suharto.  
 
By Michael Mercer 
 
Abstract: Indonesia underwent rapid decentralization, referred to as the “Big Bang”, at the turn 
of this century.  This study examines the causes and developmental impacts of this process.  For 
this study, research was conducted in Jakarta, Indonesia. The research’s aim was to examine 
the effects of the forced political decision to decentralize power from the national government 
to the district level, and its effects on development. This research was conducted by primary 
source interviews with development and government actors in Indonesia. Interviews were 
conducted in Indonesia in January, 2012 with Canadian government officials as well as with 
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Chapter One: Indonesia’s Decentralization of Power – Post Suharto  
This thesis is a study of policy decisions, and the effects of those decisions as we follow 
them down the line to their eventual implementation.  First, we explore the setting that 
Indonesia found itself in the late 1990’s, and its decision to accept an international aid 
package with conditionalities.  This decision was to have major ramifications for the 
governance and development sectors within Indonesia.  
Next, we explore the effects of those decisions and the process in which they were 
carried out.  Once the decision to acquiesce to the international donor organization was 
made, the speed at which many of those policies were implemented, and the lack of 
planning can be seen to interfere with the desired outcomes. 
We then move on to a dual practitioner data set, where two highly placed in-country 
practitioners, asked a set of the same questions, provide insight into the new Indonesian 
decentralization and development paradigm.  This is followed by a tightly focused look 
at some ways to improve the current development arena in Indonesia.  
Decentralization is a process that addresses the relationship of a government to the 
governed.  This question of relationship is, at its core, the very essence of governance: 
How do citizens and government interact?  Every law passed, every financial resource 
allocated, every election (or non-election, as the case may be), can be viewed as 
agreements between the citizens and the government to behave in a certain manner.  
These decisions can be debated, fought over, died for, agreed upon, or anything in 
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between, yet every time they are altered it is a reflection of the nature of the 
relationship question. 
Governments and citizens look for a relationship type that fits how they wish to balance 
this choice, and recently, many of them are looking - or have been forced to look - at 
forms of decentralizing power to smaller, local governments.  This isn’t the first time, 
and it won’t be the last, but it is the prevailing one now – and we will explore why.   
The nature of government and how a given country organizes to govern itself is an ever 
changing one.  Throughout history, countries, regions and even whole civilizations have 
swung the pendulum of government from wholly centralized through almost totally 
decentralized, and every point in between (Chase-Dunn, 1997, p. 20).   
In the past few decades, this swing has landed yet again on the idea of decentralization, 
as developing countries the world over have been moving away from the typically 
planned and controlled form of centralized government.  A shift towards various forms 
of decentralization and deconcentration has been a staple of their development plans.  
This change is being encouraged by a growing number of development agencies and 
international development institutions.   
As a condition of acceptance to receiving large financial support packages from 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), developing countries were 
forced to participate in a series of structural reforms that would align them with the 
prevailing neo-liberal theoretical underpinnings of: divestiture of government assets; 
8 
 
market liberalization; financial and corporate sector overhaul; and encouraged 
decentralization (International Monetary Fund, 2000).     
There are a varied set of benefits that are associated with this shift towards 
decentralization depending on such factors as: geographical characteristics, population 
makeup and diversity, historical attitudes, and capacity of the newly devolved 
geographic areas to implement the changes, among others.  
In terms of development, having a more localized approach to decision making is a key 
factor to community engagement and acceptance.  This can turn a development project 
or concept into a successful endeavour, or consequently, can be a source of irritation or 
disillusionment if overly centralized.  A clear picture of local versus central was 
presented along these lines in Lisa Courtney-Mercer’s work, which demonstrated that 
without local knowledge and buy-in, a project cannot be truly successful (Courtney-
Mercer, 2013). 
One country that had no choice but to follow the decentralization path was Indonesia, 
following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998.  This was a period in the history of the 
country that can safely be said to have been a crossroads for its development.  The 
catalyst for the change was the Asian financial crisis that shook the economies of many 
Asian countries during the period from 1997-2000 - some of its effects were still being 
felt long after the crisis was ‘over’ (Asian Development Bank, 2006).  The highly 
centralized Suharto regime was unable to react to the unexpected crisis which saw the 
Rupiah lose 80% of its value by January of 1998 and caused widespread unemployment.  
9 
 
This was due in part to the government’s highly centralized focus on domestic and local 
affairs rather than a keen sense of its duty to oversee the economic and financial sectors 
of the national economy (Rasyid, 2002).  
The changes that were implemented by then President Habibi after the fall of Suharto 
were carried out to specifically decentralize Indonesia’s political and administrative 
systems.  These changes were encouraged as a part of the conditionalities attached to 
the aid packages from the IMF and other international donor organizations1 and were 
radically different from the previous thirty years of highly centralized systems of 
administration and national development that took little account of local wishes or 
equality amongst the provinces and regions.  This change was seen as the means to 
achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the population as well as to start to concentrate on the 
areas that are generally considered to be within the purview of a central government, 
and away from delving into local administrative and development areas.  
The Indonesian/IMF loan-program, undertaken in October of 1997, offered a structural 
adjustment focused on reorienting the Indonesian economy towards privatization and 
deregulation; opening up of sectors such as forestry and banking; along with the 
decentralization of the political and administrative authorities to lower levels of 
government (Barr, 2001).    
                                                          
1
 There were numerous conditionalities attached to the aid packages proffered to Indonesia that 
aimed to transform the banking and financial system and strengthen the rules around financing and 
supervision, among others.  For the purposes of this work, we will explore the decentralization and 
governance aspects, and they will be examined later on in this thesis  
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In this thesis, I will look at what led to the decision to decentralize, the process of 
decentralization that occurred in Indonesia, and its impact on development issues in the 
post-Suharto era. 
Central Issues in Decentralization 
There are three issues that stand out as central to the decentralization debate, as every 
State must choose for itself the type of relationship it wishes to have with its citizenry.  
As in any new model of service delivery, it is possible to look at aspects of it in order to 
generate a narrative namely: the rationale behind the decision; how decentralization is 
carried out; and if the decentralized state is properly supported afterwards – and all 
three of these issues are central within the Indonesian context.   This can be grouped as 
the rationale, the setup and the follow through.    
From this perspective, these three issues all interplay and can support the basis for a 
revealing study of the decentralization issue in any context.  This ties in perfectly with 
why I chose Indonesia, and has been the inspiration for how I approached the work. 
As an example of how these three issues would resolve themselves into a cohesive 
narrative, we can look at the permitting confusion that has been shown to be a 
consequence of the decentralized process.  Research has shown that confusion and 
overlap are all too prevalent within the permitting sector, specifically in regards to 
natural resource permits and all levels of government being able to, or perceived to be 
able to, issue permits (Courtney-Mercer, 2013). 
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What we learn from this example is that the rationale for the decentralized model 
within the permitting sector was not well thought out as it was both devolved and kept 
by the higher authority at the same time.  This clearly negatively impacted the setup of 
the decentralized model, and thus the follow through was not possible without a total 
re-alignment of the sector (Barr, 2001).  
The Choice of Indonesia 
One of the main draws for me, both to this country and to the issue of decentralization, 
was the ‘Big Bang’ aspect of Indonesia’s push towards the concept and practice of 
decentralization.  As a practitioner of government and a scholar of development, I saw 
an opportunity in being able to explore the process that Indonesia undertook to break 
away from the grasp of an incredibly controlling and authoritarian regime.  This 
presented a fascinating case study opportunity, as mentioned above, the two main 
criticisms of decentralization can often be: The lack of planning, and the lack of capacity 
devolved along with the authority itself.   
Researching Indonesia’s decentralization certainly had the potential to illuminate both 
of these areas, and as was born out during this research, those two factors were and 
continue to be very prominent within the decentralization sphere.   
I did not however set out solely to cover this topic.  My original research question was 
aimed more towards the idea of Indonesia arriving at middle income status, in large part 
due to decentralization.      
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After conducting research in-country, my original theory that decentralization was the 
means by which the country has been able to achieve middle-income status was 
contradicted by those I interviewed.  They indicated that the link was simply not there, 
rather Indonesia was moving towards this goal under its former centralized power 
structure.  I was strongly advised however to examine the way in which the 
development process works by looking at the process of decentralization that was 
undertaken.  I started to shift towards this focus while on the ground and gathered 
much evidence that points towards the process being conducted in such haste as to 
have missed many of the goals of the transition.   
I was then further encouraged to look at the conditionalities and forced nature of the 
implementation, especially as a source of the haste that was applied.  While being 
forced to meet the structural reform timetable in order to receive the conditionality-
laced loan payments doesn’t totally alleviate all blame for the program being poorly 
administered, it does help to explain the haste of implementation, and its effects on the 
process.    
Research problematic 
Indonesia’s political transition from the Suharto era (1998) has had an incredible effect 
on the development of the country.  Coming from one of the most centralized and 
authoritarian regimes of the last half century, almost overnight Indonesia had to 
implement a new way of governing and directing this diverse and geographically spread 
out archipelagic island nation.   
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This event drastically shook up the political and development processes of the country 
as from that point forward there was a massive push towards decentralization of 
political power within the Indonesian national framework.   
For example, there is much concern over the manner in which the transition to a 
decentralized model was - and is - being carried out.  Overlap occurred between various 
levels of government for everything from permitting for natural resource extraction to 
financial transfers, setting of priorities and monitoring of the ministries and the system 
as a whole.  Confusion seems to be the reigning context for many development 
partners, governments at all levels and the population as a whole.  While there is 
obvious broad based support for the decentralized model, especially as the model is 
now decentralized in terms of both financial and political aspects, the manner in which 
it was and is implemented will be my research focus to determine where the problems 
are and how to fix them.   
With this transition towards decentralization, a new power balance was implemented 
that not only devolved financial and granting authority to the district level, but also, for 
the first time brought political power as well.  Legislative authority and locally elected 
bodies have been at the forefront of creating a renewed sense of political relevance to 
the population at large.  While there is still much work to be done in creating a proper 
civil society capable of interceding on behalf of the population, there is now a sense that 
the local populations have someone to hold to account through the electoral process, 
where this was never possible before.  I heard many stories of corruption, and it does 
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not seem to be an over-exaggeration to suggest that Indonesia still runs on a semi-
feudal system that has powerful figures remaining in control of much of the country’s 
resources and power base, there is a renewed sense of hope that things are slowly going 
to get better for the average citizen. 
Methodology  
I was in Indonesia from the 29th of December, 2011 to February 3rd, 2012 to conduct 
primary data gathering. I conducted interviews in Jakarta, Central Kalimantan, 
Palangaraya, Mantangai and the Kapuas River Region.  I also made a trip to Ottawa to 
conduct some background interviews with senior government civil servants. 
In the field I conducted in-depth interviews that were semi-structured, and followed a 
similar, open-ended question format. My goal was to gather first-hand information from 
practitioners in order to gain insight into the process and system of development that is 
in place.   The research presented here is a compilation of the applicable primary data 
gathered in-country, as well as extensive secondary research that is publically available 
on the various topics and issues that are explored.  As previously mentioned, I had to 
adapt to a changing research focus mid-field research, so some of the primary 
interviews that were gathered are not incorporated into this work, due to a lack of 
relevance to the new hypothesis. 
I was fortunate enough to be able to interview two high level aid practitioners in 
Indonesia, Jeffrey Ong and Erman Rahman.  While both of these men are deeply set 
within the delivery of aid through programs and services sphere – they approach the 
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matter from different viewpoints.  This formed the basis for the ‘Tale of two 
practitioners’ vantage point, and was, I believe successful at portraying the effects of 
decentralizing the governance and aid functions of the state, through the eyes of on-
the-ground practitioners.    
Both took the opportunity to be constructive in their comments and criticisms, and 
provided an unvarnished view of both the challenges and the opportunities that are 
present within the Indonesian decentralization and development apparatus. 
One issue that can arise from using practitioners as the data set, is that they are, rightly, 
approaching their observations from the vantage point of the field – not necessarily 
taking into account the theoretical underpinnings of their actions or recommendations.  
This has become evident - and will be explored later in the recommendations and 
analysis – in areas of state versus local control and vetting of development resources.  
Admittedly, their allegiances are to the practice development, and the State’s is to 
maintaining sovereignty and the overarching view of the situation.  Sometimes these 
forces will clash – and this provides for a potential critique of the theory from a 







Outline – Indonesian Decentralization 
Research Question: 
What were the obstacles to successful Indonesian decentralization, and what impact did 
this have on the country’s development?  The aim of my research is to gauge the impact 
of the decentralized form of development on Indonesia’s intended outcomes and 
expectations for this policy shift.  This will be accomplished by comparing and 
contrasting the structure of Indonesia’s governmental and development practices 
throughout the last fifteen years.   
My research analyses the current state of the development protocols in place, and their 
transformation throughout the transitional process to a decentralized form.   A move 
towards more local based decision making was the intended outcome, and is the 
correlation between decentralization and development, however there is concern with 
the hastiness of the implementation; how those issues were attempted to be resolved; 
and even in the current context, how all levels of government interplay on the 
development and decentralization files.   
These issues of decentralization and development are tied together through this 
understanding of moving decision making to the lowest participatory level, and changes 
to one have invariably impacted the other.  With particular attention to the issues of 
oversight and coordination, improvements to the decentralized development process 




Indonesia’s conditionality-contrived post-Suharto decentralization of its political and 
administrative authority from the national to the district level has caused widespread 
chaos due to poor coordination and planning.   
 Background: 
Outline for thesis  
The manner in which the decentralization was undertaken (and managed) as well as the 
effects it has had on the development of the country and the regions will be the primary 
areas of focus of this study.               
Chapter one will include an Introduction, an outline and the methodology used.  
Chapter two will present, compare and contrast the theories of decentralization within 
the literature review.  Chapter three will provide the background and history of 
Indonesia from the Soekarno era through to today, including empirical research relating 
to the Indonesian version of the decentralized model.  Chapter four is the analysis and 
presentation of research-based evidence on problems within the Indonesian model.  
Chapter five presents the recommendations within each of the evidentiary and analysis 
components, along with a conclusion to the entire work. 
Thesis Argument: 
The current decentralized Indonesian model did not meet its intended outcomes and 
expectations as there was little planning and coordination at the outset, due to the 
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imposition of conditionalities that mandated change at an untenable rate.  This lack of 
clarity carried through to the implementation and its shortcomings have only recently 
started to be addressed in the follow-up phase.  In order to correct the hastiness of the 
implementation, there are a number of challenges to overcome, particularly within the 
















Chapter Two – Literature Review (Theories of Decentralization) 
If we remove the factors that led Indonesia to implement the decentralization process 
with such haste, we are left with exploring the theoretical aspects of the concept of 
government, and the functioning of a governmental system in general.  This section will 
- for the most part - explore those issues without looking at the impetus for the 
changes, in Indonesia’s case – the civil upheaval, Asian financial crisis, and associated 
conditionality-laden loan program. 
The issue of central versus local control is not a new one in government.  This is the 
epitome of an age old question – one with moving goal posts and no perfect answer at 
that.  Governments and citizens look for a relationship type that fits how they wish to 
balance this choice, and recently, many of them are looking at forms of decentralizing 
power to smaller, local governments. 
This literature review will be structured to look at the main theoretical setting for my 
research question.  The theories of decentralization in general will be the first explored.  
The core issues will be presented to start the process of refining the landscape of the 
debate on the topic of decentralization within the global context. 
The decentralization debate centres on the nature and role of government and the 
services that it delivers.  Within this debate there seems to be a rationale to decentralize 
that can suit any philosophical bent, and perhaps it is for this reason that many sides of 
the debate can be represented. 
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The World Bank (WB), as leaders of international thinking on Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) through the 1980s and 1990s, has shifted their view of what should be 
the main focus of SAP.  In the 1980’s, the WB was almost totally pro-market – “designed 
to reduce state intervention in developing-country economies” (Drake, Malik, & Xu, 
2002 p. 6).  This paradigm changed in the 1990s from ‘getting the prices right’ to ‘getting 
the institutions right’ (Drake, Malik, & Xu, 2002). 
The WB governance worldview is associated with “enhancing the relationship between 
government, civil society, and the market in recipient states” (Drake, Malik, & Xu, 2002 
p.6).  The WB now sees a symbiotic relationship between the three sectors – and 
includes civil society as an important check and balance on the actions of the state and 
the regulation of the market (Drake, Malik, & Xu, 2002). 
The WB’s appeal of the decentralized model “stems from its potential to improve state 
governance by means of increasing competition, accountability, and flexibility. As such, 
it is a ‘cross-cutting’ reform that has a bearing on most aspects of governance” (Drake, 
Malik, & Xu, 2002 p.24).  The reader must remember that this latter day symbiotic view 
of the WB was not the model imposed on nations seeking aid in the 1990s. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the Indonesian decentralization attempt was 
determined by the fact that during the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990’s, 
Indonesia suffered terribly in terms of its currency valuation and banking system 
collapse.  By October, 1997 – after the rupiah having already been floated as a response 
to the Thai baht being floated in July – the rupiah had depreciated by 30%.  By end-July 
21 
 
1998, the rupiah had fallen by roughly 65% (relative to late 1997 levels).  “The loss of 
confidence sparked financial instability, and output collapsed, with a severe impact on 
the poor.” (International Monetary Fund, 2000).   
This led to a necessary loan program implemented by international donor organizations 
– spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), totalling $43 Billion.  As a part 
of this neo-liberal structural adjustment program, conditionalities were attached to the 
loans that necessitated various structural reforms of the Indonesian economy (Barr, 
2001).  The neo-liberal structural adjustment components featured a heavy emphasis on 
privatization, deregulation and fiscal austerity – coupled with a push to decentralized 
political and administrative control over most sectors of the economy.  This will be 
further explored as a function of the conditionalities section later in this literature 
review, and within other sections of this work.  Decentralization of government is 
defined rather broadly as “any transfer of power from the centre to sub-national levels, 
thus including both the conventional categories of devolution and deconcentration” 
(Conyers, 1984, p. 187).  A further and slightly differing definition, sees decentralization 
as “a division of the national resource pool amongst a country’s sub national districts, 
and the allocation of residual powers to independent and accountable governments in 
each” (Faguet, 2004, p. 25).  In comparing these two definitions, which both aim to set 
decentralization to their respective philosophical viewpoints, we start to see the subtle 
yet divergent ways in which this subject is approached.  This sets the stage for the 
debate that will follow in these pages on the types and forms – and philosophies – of 
this development model. 
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Countries of all sizes have inherent challenges when it comes to governance.  Governing 
in and of itself is presented with a challenge to the forms and structures of the 
execution of power.  While there are a multitude of possibilities when it comes to 
setting up a government structure, each country and citizenry must decide for itself 
which manner they are going to abide by.  The questions surrounding the exercise of 
power and the concept of redistribution have been asked and debated since the 
formation of the first collection of villages decided – or were forced - to work together 
and share their resources in common (Sahlins, 1972).  History has taught us that getting 
this balance correct can be the difference between enduring dynasty and brief historical 
footnote; although it must be noted that no state has so far lasted forever.  The Romans 
tried a very centralized control mechanism over a vast territory, and were successful for 
a time, but ultimately that grew too unwieldy to manage.  There have been countless 
historical and modern examples of empires or super-regions that could not maintain 
their diverse and power-imbalanced accords.  Take a look at a map from the 1980’s and 
it is plain to see that many populations chose - or were forced - to seek a new 
relationship with their fellow citizens or neighbours. 
There have been consistent calls for either more autonomy or more centralization in 
governance philosophy, with a proper balance of the two often being the stated aim, 
yet that balance is a very difficult target to hit and can vary depending on the 
circumstances of the day.  Generally speaking, in times of crisis there is a move towards 
a centralized control model, often for defensive or nationalistic purposes.  In times of 
relaxed prosperity, the reverse is often seen, with a move towards loosening the 
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centralized control mechanisms.  These are generalizations of course, and there are 
exceptions on all of these fronts but the trends mentioned above hold true as a matter 
of generally observed behaviour (Faguet, 2004). 
One of the aspects of this tug of war that is invariably present is the matter of 
regionalism.  All countries, no matter their size, have to deal with this issue in some 
manner.  How much control to cede to those that do not live in the immediate area is an 
issue perennially debated and never resolved.   
The United States presents a strong historical case study in this area in the form of ‘The 
Federalist Papers’, a collection of essays by some of the most prominent of the 
‘founding fathers’ arguing in support of ratification of the U.S. constitution.  Arguments 
and detailed explanations were meticulously laid out that were an attempt to convince 
their fellow citizens of the merits of their proposal for the way in which their republic 
should be governed (Federalist Papers, 2010).  This demonstrates that there was an 
ongoing debate at the time to determine the best course of action for the fledgling 
country, and that debate still rages on in the state houses and national legislative 
chambers.  This is invariably how the process works, and is one that is rarely - if ever - 
settled for good; as we can plainly see in the British Commonwealth of today (Economic 
and Social Research Council, 2006).  
The exercise of power by government over its citizens can be achieved in a variety of 
ways and by all of the many layers of government that exist.  As in any question, there 
are benefits and drawbacks associated with all of the theoretical ways to structure this 
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exercise of power.  There are also many variances in the theoretical versus actual power 
structures and their stated intentions. This literature review will attempt to provide 
both an overview of the main types of power structures for all levels of governments, 
both developed and developing. 
This section of the literature review will be structured in the following manner:   
A. Introduction to the terminology of government structure, including the terms 
utilized within the decentralization debate;  
B. Devolution as a theoretical concept;  
C. Deconcentration as a theoretical concept;  
D. The theory of decentralization; and 
E. The forms of power exercised and used in developing and developed 
countries and their rationales. 
 
A. Government:  “Government is not reason; it is not eloquent; it is force.  Like fire, 
it is a dangerous servant and a fearful master.” George Washington 
(Washington, 1790). 
George Washington is reminding us that government is, in our modern age, a necessary 
burden.  For all of the complaints we have of our governments, and for all of the 
imperfections that are inherent in any organization that has fallible human beings as the 
ultimate authority, we rely on governments for so many things: from keeping the water 
in our taps running, to defense of the weak and innocent, and to the regulation of the 
vast majority of the aspects and interactions of our daily lives.   
25 
 
A major focus of this work is to attempt to gain more perspective on the various aspects 
of government and its relationships with the citizens that it represents.  In order to 
conduct this study we must first understand the nature of its existence and couple that 
with the many facets of the decentralized model.   
As is sometimes the case in developing countries, the citizenry’s experiences with 
government can be negative ones.  For some, governments are to be avoided and 
feared, not counted on for clean drinking water.  It is this variance in relationship that I 
believe Washington was referring to; a relationship that we constantly strive to balance, 
in the hopes of finding a perfect fit. 
 
i. General structure: Governments exist on many levels and can take many names for 
their various parts.  They are generally structured on a geographical basis and are often 
considered to be layered from widest to narrowest in terms of encompassing area.  
Typically, there is a national government that oversees such areas as are deemed to be 
in its national sphere of influence.  The next level of government down is often a 
regional/state/provincial one.  The last level is generally one that encompasses a city or 
regional municipality.  By structuring the layers in this manner, there is the theoretical 
separation of powers that allows for governments of all levels to maintain control over 
the jurisdictional areas of responsibility that they each maintain (Tanzi, 1996).  There is a 
natural flow of power, authority and responsibility from one level to the next, in keeping 
with the assigned duties of each level. 
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ii. Government role: Government’s role is to control and exercise the power over 
political decision making, this involves making and enforcing laws as well as arbitrating 
conflicts (Barclay, 1990, p. 31).  These conflicts often arise out of a scarcity of resources, 
the allocation of which is often at the heart of political decisions that must necessarily 
be made or arbitrated.   
B. Devolution: 
The concept of devolution of powers and responsibilities keeps the overall authority for 
the powers in question at the sovereign state level, while granting powers over an area 
to a lesser body (Economic and Social Research Council, 2006).  This might take the form 
of a central government of a sovereign state granting provincial governments the ability 
to assign mining licenses and collect the revenues, either example of which would be 
devolving the central government’s powers in that specific area to the provincial level.  
The term devolution is often used in the decentralization framework and can be 
considered a form of decentralization, as it does provide for the downloading of 
responsibilities to a lesser governmental level.  The main difference in this area, which is 
not always fully recognized, is that the top level government that grants the authority is 
doing so on a loan basis rather than wholly divesting its power in the area.  While it 
might remain politically difficult to do so, the devolved powers can be taken back, 
effectively recalling the loan.  This nuance is often not recognized and is an important 
one.  In Northern Ireland for example, devolution has been suspended a number of 
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times as the British parliament grapples with this new form of power sharing (Economic 
and Social Research Council, 2006). 
In Canada, as an example of a Federal state, the sub-national governments that have 
devolved powers have them granted within the guaranteed context of a constitution, 
which specifically enumerates the assigned powers to each level of government, and 
would thusly require the consent of more than just the granting authority to take back 
the powers. 2 
C. Deconcentration: 
This facet of decentralization allows for redistribution of decision making authority from 
the central power to agents acting on its behalf (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999).  This generally 
applies to civil servants in regions outside of the capitol who are still under the ultimate 
authority of the central power.  An agency regional director of the central power would 
be a good example of deconcentrated authority over certain areas and responsibilities.  
Often this term applies to areas of responsibility of different levels of the central 
government. 
D. The Theory of Decentralization 
Decentralization is a widely prescribed theory of development that at its most basic 
level allows for the transferring of power and responsibilities from the national to sub-
national governments.  The theory goes that this transfer will provide the citizens with 
                                                          
2
 Federal states have various ways to amend their constitutions. However all require some type 
consent from all levels of government, and often the citizens as well in some form of consultative process.  
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easier and more direct access to the services and necessities of government that they 
require (Hannan, 2003, p. 2).  There are many forms and interpretations of 
decentralization; the most common being political, administrative and fiscal. 
Political Decentralization aims to provide citizens and locally elected representatives 
with greater policy-making power and can often be the catalyst for the decentralization 
avenue overall (Mitchell & Bossert, 2010, p. 669).  It is generally assumed by advocates 
that more local participation will lead to better informed outcomes that are more 
relevant to diverse interests (The World Bank Group, 2001). 
Fiscal Decentralization equips local jurisdictions with greater authority over the use and 
collection of revenues that are spent at the local level and in support of locally 
designated projects.  Fiscal independence is often the tool that allows for the freedom 
to exert independent political control and not be subject to overtures of the central 
authority (Mitchell & Bossert, 2010, p. 669).  
Administrative Decentralization allows the role of the local level in delivering public 
services to be expanded and, through the political side, directed to be in tune with the 
wishes of the local citizens (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007). 
These three areas of decentralization all play important individual roles in any 
decentralized reform process.  As is evident in their descriptions, they all have value in 
their respective areas of influence; however, it is when they are implemented in tandem 
and allowed to interact that they enhance each other and demonstrate their true 
strength.  As an example, if only political power were given to a region and the fiscal 
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area retained by the central government, there is an inherent veto power over any 
decisions made by the local body.  One of the tenets of combined decentralization is 
often that “the decentralization framework must link, at the margin, local financing and 
fiscal authority to the service provision responsibilities and functions of the local 
government - so that local politicians can bear the costs of their decisions and deliver on 
their promises” (Center for International Earth Science Information Network , p. 2). 
E. Forms of Exercised Power  
There is a historical perspective that shows that prior to the mid 1980’s, fiscal and 
administrative decentralization were mostly used “as a means to overcome perceived 
inefficiencies and bureaucratic rigidities in the public sector” (Mitchell & Bossert, 2010, 
p. 669).  Following the mid 1980’s, political decentralization was added to complete 
what we know as the entirety of decentralization (political, economic and 
administrative).  This is now seen as one way to increase the reform agendas that 
pertain to the oversight of governance and democracy which have been a mainstay of 
reform movements over the past quarter of a century.  This has led to an empowering 
of local governments to the currently conceptualized theory of decentralization: making 
decision-makers more accountable to the beneficiaries of public policies and services, 
namely its citizens (Center for International Earth Science Information Network, p. 2). 
The overarching theory is that control gets moved to lower levels of government and 
away from the central one.  It is seen by many in the development sphere as a way to 
reduce central control over outlying areas and to better focus the various levels of the 
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state on the tasks that are suited to each level (White & Smoke, 2005).  While a city 
government is not often able to intercede on matters of national security – this being a 
central government role – there are countless examples of national governments 
delving into the traditional roles of local government in areas such as infrastructure, 
crop management, and permitting, to name just a few.  While there are arguments to 
be made on both sides of the debate over areas such as health and education, more 
often than not, these areas were claimed by central governments and have only been 
shared through efforts centred on decentralization. 
One of the main benefits of this hiving off of control is that this control must naturally 
fall closer to the population.  A strengthened local political franchise is one of the many 
positives that often accompany decentralization, and this result is frequently a catalyst 
for the decentralization in the first place.  Citizens have the opportunity to actually meet 
and see their political representatives as they work in the community rather than lose 
them to the capitol city.  There is also more power in the hands of more people, which is 
seen as a way to reduce the staggering levels of corruption of many developing 
countries.  Whether this is as effective as imagined, or a means to put more people into 
positions to take less is a topic that will be explored further in subsequent chapters. 
The Impetus for Decentralization 
Over the last quarter of a century decentralization has been a policy option for 
developing countries and they have been choosing this option on an ever increasing 
scale (White & Smoke, 2005).  One of the many factors that has led to this shift is the 
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transition of many countries from authoritarian rule to forms of democracy (Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network).  This has necessitated a reconnection 
to the citizenry as a means to capture this new power base, which is needed to maintain 
power in a democracy.  Delivering enhanced service to the population is one of the 
primary roles of a democratic government, and the decentralized model is seen as a 
means to allow this function to be focused on (White & Smoke, 2005). 
Another factor that enhances the decentralized model is the focus on governance, 
which is at the top of nearly every international donor and aid agency’s policy mandate 
(Brautigam & Knack, 2004).  The most encompassing definition that I have found to 
describe governance is espoused by Carolyn Hannan, the director for the United Nations 
division for the advancement of women.   During her speech in 2003, organized by the 
Indonesian permanent mission to the UN, she said: 
“Governance refers to the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their 
obligations and mediate their differences.  Governance touches upon issues such as the 
interaction between the state and civil society, the legal framework, public 
administration, economic development, development policies, and peace and security” 
(Hannan, 2003, p. 1). 
Allowing political control to be ceded to lower levels of government (i.e., expanding the 
political class) starts to take away the threat of more ‘command economy’ type 
principles as well as making it a more stable form of government.  Both of these factors 
can be identified as rationale for why authoritarian governments would not have 
pursued decentralization, which effectively makes it a bulwark against the re-emergence 
of authoritarian governments. 
32 
 
The Debate  
There are a number of arguments mobilized by both proponents and opponents of 
decentralization.  The debate focuses on several issues: Administrative efficiency, local 
competition, fiscal incentives, democracy, local information and innovation, and even 
holding the country together. 
Administrative efficiency   
Wallace Oates argues for the administration of multi-tier government that makes it 
possible to satisfy citizens’ demands for public goods and services more precisely and 
cost-effectively (Oates, 1972).  Where appropriate, for areas of policy, preference or 
geography that might suit itself to a larger scale unit of output – such as defence - or a 
smaller scale unit of output – such as forestry services - to have the option to utilize 
whatever means is more practical and which would provide administrative efficiency 
(Tanzi, 1996).  
This is countered as a fully implemented decentralized rationale by Daniel Treisman as 
he maintains that it would only be the administrative side of the decentralized model 
that would be necessary to encourage this efficiency.  He further argues that this change 
would only make the efficiencies possible, not definite, and that “to know whether 
more tiers leads to greater efficiency, one must know how functions are allocated...it is 
an argument for cost-benefit analysis, not for a particular structure of government or 
direction of reform.” (Treisman, 2007, p. 12).  
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Local Competition:   
Hayek argues that competition to attract mobile residents and investment induces local 
governments to be more honest, efficient and responsive.  The argument in favour is 
that central governments are able to accomplish this in their trade and foreign policy 
mandates and can lure investment to its borders, yet have a hard time implementing 
these policy options once within their borders.  At that point, the country is seen as a 
whole rather than as requiring competition amongst the parts, therefore these 
responsibilities to drive competition should be given directly to local governments, 
bypassing the central authority (Hayek, 1948). 
A similar counter argument to the efficiency debate sits in contrast.  It goes that these 
conditions to acquire mobile residents amidst local competition would be so difficult to 
replicate in the real world that the argument in favour is hard to make.  The 
continuation of the argument is that competition is not often virtuous, but is frequently 
perverse, which would lead to less competition through less desirable outcomes and 
efficiency.  Think of each local government offering ever increasing incentives for 
business and residents to move to its particular jurisdiction.  This already happens on an 
international scale and would only be replicated further if brought to the domestic level, 
says Treisman.  He goes on to state that a motivated central government could achieve 
the same results, which would further undermine a decentralized model (Treisman, 




Fiscal Incentives:  
Increasing local governments’ portion in a shared tax should increase their motivation to 
support local economic activity and local initiatives, resulting in a heightened economic 
performance both locally as well as nationwide; effectively this is ‘the more skin in the 
game, the more incentive one has to perform’ argument.  This is one of the main 
arguments that is encountered when reading the rationale for decentralization and is 
becoming the heart of many of the calls for the adoption of a decentralized model in the 
risk management area of the financial sector as a whole (Taleb, 2012).  
Providing this type of fiscal authority to the local levels ties in with the franchise of the 
local population and their particular preferences for local initiatives spending and when 
combined with the incentive argument, this makes for a potent combination (Center for 
International Earth Science Information Network). 
The counter argument to this concept is that to give to one level of government taxation 
authority, by necessity, an equal amount of taxation must be taken away from another 
level.  This would be akin to Newton’s third law of motion that for every action there is 
an equal and opposite reaction or to the ‘zero sum game’ aspect of game theory, 
whereby one gains and the offsetting losses are suffered by the other participant 
(Colman, 1995).  The counter argument continues by positing that with the decrease in 
fiscal contribution, so would the motivation of the level of government who 
relinquished the powers.  As Treisman points out, “Because, for better or worse, all 
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levels of government can influence economic performance, the resulting net effect on 
performance is indeterminate” (Treisman, 2007, p. 12) 
One area that this counter argument fails to address is the nature of the democratic 
process that comes from spending powers and their determination being made locally, 
as referenced in the original argument in support of fiscal incentives being important for 
decentralized models. 
Democracy:  
Decentralization, by decreasing the scale of government, increases citizen participation 
and promotes civic engagement (Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network ).  One of the big factors at play here, mentioned earlier, is the increase in 
electoral accountability that comes from having a more direct say in who controls the 
various aspects of the functions of government.  For example, rather than electing a 
single representative to oversee all of government’s responsibilities, it is segmented into 
manageable and accountable portions for ease of determining either blame or credit.   
This consequently allows for a heightened sense of voter engagement and information 
as the voter can parse the various performances of each level of government, and 
because voters in small groups can coordinate better on a voting strategy (Treisman, 
2007). 
The natural critique of this argument is that ultimately the responsibility always remains 
with the voter to seek to be informed.  Simply by being portioned into small and 
manageable groups does not facilitate the act of informing oneself in and of itself.  
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Treisman makes the argument that only in the tiniest of communities would there 
actually be anything close to resembling total participatory local government and that it 
is all a variation of degrees after that.  When confronted with the electoral 
accountability argument, the prevailing counter argument is that simply because there 
are multiple tiers, this does not neatly subdivide the various functions of government as 
neatly.  In practice, shared jurisdiction and management of resources could conceivably 
confound the electors further rather than clear up the lines of authority (Treisman, 
2007). 
Local information and policy innovation:  
Proponents of local government argue that it is better suited to elicit and make use of 
local information or is more motivated to do so.  Decentralization should increase policy 
experimentation as there are more actors trying to solve similar problems and there is 
no ‘group think’, allowing for a more fertile ground for testing of policy ideas.  While 
local organizations might be better placed to make use of local information, it is 
conceivable that a larger organization would have more resources to bring to bear on an 
issue, thus negating the small organization’s advantage in this regard.  
Holding the country together:  
Vito Tanzi makes the argument for decentralization being a source of cohesion for 
countries with heterogeneous populations.  The argument goes that decentralization 
would be an inducement to remain a part of the federation to the various sections of 
the population that might feel to be distinct within the overall social construct (Tanzi, 
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1996).  By giving them more of a direct say in their own affairs, they would be more apt 
to remain as a part of the federation (Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network ). 
While this might be possible for some countries – Russia and Ethiopia are given as 
examples – this would necessitate that the ethnic, linguistic, racial, or cultural groups be 
regionally distributed to affect this type of decentralization.  In other words, this type of 
franchise would be a difficult task if the populations were spread out and not 
geographically cohesive, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia. 
Understanding the historical makeup of Indonesia is an important component to this 
study.  The next chapter will knit together the various threads that have led Indonesia to 
its decentralized development approach.  
Decentralization: Structural Adjustment, Neoliberalism and the Conditionalities 
approach  
In the abstract, the issues presented and reviewed above form the backbone of the 
decentralization debate.  This does not take into account however the issue of structural 
adjustment and its associated conditionalities, which must also be addressed in the 
theoretical section of this work. 
Structural adjustment programs (SAP) are a function of the prevailing 1980’s and 1990’s 
neo-liberal approach to both macroeconomic and development theory.  SAPs could 
mandate a raft of policy changes - depending on the situation - that obligated recipient 
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countries to liberalize and promote international trade and investment; to reform 
financial and banking sectors; reduce inflation; promote exports; meet debt-repayment 
schedules; decrease budget deficits; and decentralize many aspects of the recipient 
country’s administrative and political system (International Monetary Fund, 2000).  
These programs are attached to financial aid packages arranged through international 
lending agencies such as the IMF and World Bank.   
There are those that argue that the SAP and their mandated conditionalities are not at 
all the proper prescription for helping countries caught in the midst of financial turmoil, 
and that developing countries are best to steer well clear of IMF counsel.  As Smitha 
Francis writes in an article for Global Policy Forum, using our Indonesian model as her 
example: 
The IMF has refused to take any responsibility for the way its wrong policy advice 
exacerbated the crisis and stalled the subsequent recovery. Further, instead of 
providing any long-lasting solution to the debt burden which they themselves 
helped create and accumulate, the multilateral bodies and bilateral donors have 
continuously insisted on policy measures requiring stringent constraints on 
expenditure and increased revenue mobilization, for servicing this sharply 
increased debt burden.  (Francis, 2003)  
To go even further in the criticism of SAPs and conditionalities, there is another 
argument that says the programs extend far beyond the 1944 ‘Articles of Agreement’ 
that established the IMF – especially with respect to overstepping into clearly outlined 
jurisdictional sovereignty (Lee, 2003).   
This is an extension of the ‘IMF doesn’t pass up a good crisis’ argument, that speaks to 
the Fund needing these crises in order to make the necessary inroads into developing 
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economies.  As Henry Veltmeyer and James Petras lay it out, using the 2008 global 
financial crisis in their example (which in their view would apply to much of the neo-
liberal agenda) “the crisis has been used to the strategic advantage of capital in its class 
war against labor, to further the accumulation of capital and the consolidation of 
















Chapter 3 – Background, Current situation and empirical data 
In order to fully contextualize the Indonesian development story, a look at the factors 
that have influenced its development must be conducted.  Everything from geography 
to political history and ethnicity has combined to create a truly unique and exceptional 
case.  These issues and many more will be explored to document the reasons for the 
country’s march towards decentralization and the manner in which it was conducted. 
Indonesia – An Overview: 
The archipelagic country of Indonesia is a collection of over 13,000 islands that straddle 
the equator in South East Asia.  Indonesia’s total area, including its territorial waters, is a 
little less than 2 million square kilometers at 1,904,569 sq km, and it has a population of 
over 242 million people (The Work Bank, 2013).  It is the 4th most populous country in 
the world after China, India, and the United States and is the most populous Muslim 
nation.  There are five large islands that contain over 92% of the total population: Java, 
Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and West Papua.  Java, home to the Capitol, Jakarta, 
comprises over two thirds of the total population on its own, at 15,342 people per km2,  
making it one of the world’s highest population densities (Bhattacharya & Pengeshu, 
1997).   
The Indonesian population is over 95% indigenous ethnic Malay.  Within this Malay 
context there are over 350 various ethnic and linguistic groups represented, many with 
their own customary laws, and norms (Resosudarmo, 2005).  In religious terms, the 
country is very homogenous at over 90% Muslim.  There has been a relatively successful 
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trend since independence to unify their national language in the form of Bahasa 
Indonesia, although this has not stopped the concurrent uses of most regional dialects.  
It is not uncommon for travelled Indonesians to speak multiple regional dialects and for 
conversations to be in a mutually understood dialect, even if neither party is from the 
area where the dialect is in use3.   
Indonesia is a former Dutch colony, greatly prized for its immense natural resource 
wealth and highly favourable agricultural conditions (Resosudarmo, 2005).  Many 
considered it to be the jewel in the Dutch colonial crown, and it was this Dutch 
occupation that ultimately led to the Indonesian independence movement and its 
eventual independence - post-World War Two.  This spirit to control its own destiny has 
so far manifested itself three times – at independence, the Suharto uprising, and the 
overthrow of Suharto as dictator in 1998 – likely tracing its formation to the idea that 
“since Dutch colonization, the state has asserted itself as the ultimate source of law, 
rights, and order, claiming a monopoly on authority and governance” (Centre for 
International Environmental Law, 2002, p. xxvii).    
Indonesia – Origins 
During the 7th through 14th centuries, the Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya, an advanced 
civilisation of its day, flourished on Sumatra and at its peak extended to West Java and 
the Malay Peninsula.  At roughly the same time, the Hindu kingdom of Majapahit had 
                                                          
3
 While travelling through Kalimantan province (Borneo) with my interpreter, he would change 
dialects frequently to one that the majority of the local population would be able to converse in, often not 
even the dialect from that particular area.  
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risen in Eastern Java.  These 2 civilizations, along with many tributary regions that would 
cover roughly the current expanse of Indonesia, had a system of allegiances that started 
to knit this region together.  Islam began to spread throughout the entire area and had 
supplanted Hinduism by the end of the 16th century on Java and Sumatra, although the 
island of Bali remains to this day predominantly Hindu.   
Beginning in 1602, the Dutch started to forcefully acquire lands and began to rule areas 
of what is now Indonesia.  This was accomplished by exploiting the inherent weaknesses 
of the many small Islamic kingdoms. The Portuguese managed to retain East Timor 
throughout the Dutch expansion, holding it until 1975.  During the 300 years of Dutch 
rule, natural resources were discovered, harvested, and exploited to the extent that the 
colony was turned into one of the richest colonial possessions in the world (United 
States State Department, 2012). 
This history is important to the development of the independence movements that have 
sprung up at various junctures in Indonesian history, both to demonstrate that the 
formation of the country itself was a Dutch construct over the long term, and for the 
historical roots of religion within its borders, which account for some of the stresses that 
have impacted on the decentralization debate (Nordholt & Van Klinken, 2007). 
Indonesia – 1940`s to 1999 
For the three hundred years of Dutch colonial rule the colony of Indonesia was forced to 
play a resource extraction role for its colonial master.  The Dutch Governor-General of 
Java, B.C. de Jonge (1931-1936) remarked “we have ruled here for 300 years with the 
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whip and the club, and we shall still be doing it for another 300 years” (O'Lincoln, 2009, 
p. 83).  As this paternalistic and forceful attitude demonstrates the lack of any forward 
thinking on the Dutch side relating to independence of any type, there was clearly no 
attempt to prepare or to elevate colonial Indonesians into the administrative class, as 
the British did with India.  This led to a much unprepared country when Independence 
was first gained, and took years to even start to rectify (Masters, n.d.) Unsurprisingly, 
this treatment led to a resentment of the subordinate colonial role that Indonesians 
were forced to play and ultimately, to an independence movement.  As with many such 
former colonies, there was a long and bitter battle for the colony`s right to become a 
self-determining country. 
Soekarno, an independence leader during the 1920`s and 1930`s, managed to obtain 
weapons and training from the Japanese – who had captured the colony from the Dutch 
during WWII – as the Japanese foresaw the inevitable invasion by the allies.  While they 
were counting on the armed Indonesian`s to help repel the allies, Soekarno saw this as 
an opportunity to seed an army for eventual independence.  When the British arrived 
and freed the captive Dutch troops, these troops, along with some Dutch 
reinforcements managed to re-take the major cities and towns of Indonesia, with the 
armed Indonesians holding the countryside.  Soekarno and Mohammed Hatta 
proclaimed the independent Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945 with Soekarno 
and Hatta as President and Vice-President respectively (Library of Congress, 1992).  
Eventually due to pressure from the United States over Marshall Plan aid – they weren`t 
going to be delivering aid to the Dutch if they remained a colonial power – the foreign 
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troops left Indonesia and the country was formed with Soekarno as its first President 
(Dillon, 2007, p. 20). 
Indonesia was recognized as a sovereign state by the Netherlands in 1949. The new 
constitution was based on the doctrine of Pancasila4 which was based on five guiding 
principles of the Indonesian nation. These included a belief in the "one and only God," 
although this reference to God is not meant to be specific to any particular religion 
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 1997).  Soekarno had such a broad and unstable 
governing coalition of nationalists, advocates of political Islam, and Communists that the 
resulting clashes led to an increasingly unstable government (Sato, 2003). 
The Soekarno period in Indonesia was its first attempt at self-rule.  With the 
amalgamation of disparate groups into a parliamentary coalition, one of the key 
elements of this period was the attempt at party politics.  The unwieldy parliamentary 
system soon dropped in favour of his ‘Guided Democracy’ period, was the first 
manifestation of a local authoritarianism that ultimately lasted until 1999.  As is usually 
suggested by any form of imposed democracy, the philosophy of Guided Democracy was 
heavy on the guidance and light on the democracy, with “Soekarno as ‘the people’s 
spokesman’ [who] was assumed to directly represent the will of people (rakyat) without 
the medium of elections.  It was certainly charismatic personal rule where there was no 
place for political institutions per se” (Sato, 2003, p. 7) 
                                                          
4
 Pancasila was the Indonesian state philosophy, formulated by the Indonesian nationalist leader 
Soekarno.  The five principles were: the belief in one God; just and civilized humanity; Indonesian unity; 




 Guided democracy’s relationship with the outlying provinces and territories of the 
country were a far cry from those of the more populated and increasingly dominant city 
centres.  As early as the 1949 independence, feelings of neglect and disorganization 
were beginning to appear and these feelings only grew as Soekarno failed to have 
meaningful interactions with those outside his power base of Java (Van der Kroef, 1958).  
This is especially important to note for this paper’s later look at the decentralization of 
Indonesia, as it appears that the seeds for decentralization were planted at this very 
juncture.  These feelings of discontent only continued to grow with the authoritarian 
switch from Soekarno to Suharto as the grip on the country was tightened even further.  
Suharto’s policies of dealing with the provinces through his stated ‘decentralization’ 
were in fact virtually total centrally controlled.  By the end of the Suharto regime’s 30 
year run, the centre-periphery experience was being described in quite unhealthy 
terms: 
“The New Order’s over-centralisation, in almost every aspect of national life, had been 
the main grievance in the regions.  Not only were the social, political economic activities 
of the regions tightly regulated and controlled by Jakarta, most of regional wealth was 
also taken by Jakarta.” (Anwar, 2005, p. 109; see also Ahmad & Mansoor, 2002).   
This faux decentralization was accomplished by enacting laws that did in fact provide a 
framework for the devolution of power from centre to periphery while at the same time 
doing nothing to actually implement these laws or devolution.  On the books, local 
authority was the rule, but in practice anything except centrally planned and executed 
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policies was all but unheard of.  This effectively neutralized all of the 27 provincial and 
333 district levels of control over their own areas of responsibility while at the same 
time appearing to be just the opposite (Ahmad & Mandoor, 2002, p. 4).  
Anwar Shah makes the case that during this period Indonesia was more of a model of 
deconcentration than decentralization, as the central government had exercised 
significant control over both the appointments and funds of local officials (Shah, 1999). 
It goes without saying that the forty or so years spent under both Soekarno and Suharto 
regimes was a very formative era for Indonesia.  These two men and their governments 
were oppressive, dictatorial, greedy, corrupt and violent.  This legacy set the stage for 
the troubles that the country faced when true democracy and decentralization had to 
be implemented.  There is still a level of distrust and mismanagement that carries 
forward from these eras.   
Two of the main legacy elements that have been identified throughout the field 
research for this paper are those of graft and corruption.  These issues permeated the 
government and were a huge component to the previous eras, especially Suharto’s.  
Corruption was pervasive and was simply the way of life under his rule; from the small 
scale of obtaining licenses and every day permits by local officials to the largest possible 
scale of granting nationwide monopolies to friends and relatives to rake in billions of 
dollars (Greenless, 2008).  
How has this carried forward to how business is conducted in today’s environment?  Has 
decentralization been able to change the nature of or banish corruption completely?  
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These questions will be explored as this work progresses and are important indicators 
for how the decentralization process was managed. 
Despite the corruption of the Suharto era, by many measures there had been ‘progress’ 
in Indonesia.  The comparison of poverty levels at the beginning and the end of his 
tenure are a good example of this; 60% of the total population when he took over in 
1968 compared to 13% at the start of the Asian financial crisis (Greenless, 2008).  It 
must also be noted that many of the social indicators had risen dramatically including 
access to health and education and infant mortality rates (McGlynn & Sulistyo, 2005).  It 
is not then surprising that there is a certain fondness for the Suharto period among 
many Indonesians, especially evident in the sometimes unpredictable nature of 
democratic and decentralization initiatives (Bhakti, 2004, p. 195). 
This was accomplished in part due to the centralized nature of the government during 
his tenure.  While the wealth wasn’t in any way distributed equitably, there was wealth 
generation alongside rising social indicators.  With the 1997 hit of the Asian financial 
crisis, the untenable position for Suharto became clear, and after his fall the Habibi 
government did all it could to rapidly deviate from the previous centralized and 
managed philosophy.  
This rapid change in perspective will be explored in depth in the following chapter, as 
there is a very real case to be made for this having been pushed through with little 
thought to the implementation process or the policy outcomes of such poor planning.  
While the processes of decentralization and democratization might have been started or 
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even accomplished, they appear to have been done with so little planning that the 
question of effectiveness remains a very real and powerful concern. 
Indonesian decentralization model 
Introduction 
Indonesia came out of the Suharto era needing to modernize in a number of policy areas 
and sectors.  There had not been any legitimate form of political opposition in almost 
half a century, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was stagnant and economic 
development was on the decline.  The Asian financial crisis had been the final straw for 
Suharto and in 1998 he had no choice but to leave (Green, 2005). 
The political winds of change were sweeping through the country and opposition was 
building to many of the strictly enforced policies of the past 30 years.  Corruption and 
abuse was rife and the citizenry was starting to push back.   
When conducting my in-country research, I was in Yogyakarta, the only Sultanate5 in the 
country, where I happened to be in a taxi on my way to an interview.  As I was talking to 
the driver about why I was there and asking him about the changes he has seen from 
the Suharto era to today, he replied with a joke: 
During the Suharto era, a man in Jakarta had a terrible toothache and the pain 
was getting to be too much.  He decided to go to Hong Kong to see a dentist.  
When he showed up for his appointment, the Hong Kong dentist asked him 
where he was from.  “I’m from Indonesia” he replied.  The doctor stated “it must 
                                                          
5
 Yogyakarta is the only in Indonesia city ruled by a hereditary Sultan.  This is due to the support 
provided to the independence movement by a previous Sultan during the Indonesian National Revolution  
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be terrible to come down with such a painful toothache while traveling!” and the 
man replied, “Oh no doctor, I had this toothache in Jakarta and decided to come 
and see you” the doctor exclaimed “but I have many colleagues in Indonesia, 
some I even trained with and they are very good, why would you not have gone 
to see a dentist in your country?”  The patient looked at the doctor very seriously 
and said “you are correct that we have some of the best dentists in the region; 
the problem is, in my country you are not allowed to open your mouth!” 
This taxi driver had provided a humourous anecdote to a situation that I found many 
people expressing during my travels throughout the country.  He went on to say that 
there were indeed problems with the current government, its policies and its direction, 
but that overall, he could tell the joke that he just said, and that counted as a positive in 
his book.  This freedom of expression seems to have meant the most to this gentleman, 
as I’m sure it does to many Indonesians even while they work to fix the many problems 
that still remain, or have arisen since Suharto’s departure. 
We must remember that changing a system of government, even if perceived to be for 
the better, does not make social, political or economic problems go away overnight.  
This is the exact position that Indonesia is in today.  While changing from an 
authoritarian rule of such length, the tides of change are invariably slow, and issues are 
going to be encountered. 
The Indonesian model of decentralization is often referred to as an example of ‘Big 
Bang’ decentralization (Mishra, 2012) – that is to say, a very quick switch to 
decentralization from a centrally controlled model.  As explored in previous chapters, 
this moment was building for a long period of time, and for a number of reasons.  This 
section will focus on how that transition was managed – after the decision was made to 
decentralize - and explore the model that is in use, both theoretically and in practice, as 
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well as the benefits and drawbacks of this type of radical reversal of governmental 
structure. 
Transition 
With the 1998 collapse of the Suharto – New Order regime, Indonesia entered a 
transitional phase away from authoritarian rule and towards a democratic system of 
government.  This transition was precipitated by “a complex interplay between 
domestic and international dynamics” (Anwar, 2005, p. 201).  This interplay rested on 
the cold war era practice of Western countries’ support – political, monetary and 
military - to strong anti-communist governments that would be in the business of 
containing communism and that would be committed to combat the specific threat of 
communist expansion.  While support for these countries was overt and beneficial - 
even to many dictatorships – many anti-communist recipient countries were not 
sufficiently prepared for the change in mindset that accompanied the receding threat of 
communism.   
With other factors now driving the Western powers – and their associated financial 
incentives and development dollars - past practices of overlooking egregious internal 
human rights and electoral abuses could no longer be tolerated.  If the Western 
countries were to be true champions of democracy, and the communist threat had 
receded enough that this was no longer an excuse to overlook these policies of abuses, 
many authoritarian regimes had to face this new reality: The shift from black and white 
ideological conflict to a more diverse and broad range of issues such as “the promotion 
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of democracy, human rights, environmental protection and market liberalization” 
(Anwar, 2005, p. 202) 
Indonesia was no exception to this shift – nor to the resulting change in internal political 
mindset (Sukma, 2012).  Suharto, however, was not sufficiently prepared for this 
attitudinal realignment, and he failed to read the support for these ideas from within his 
own country.  In The Fall of Suharto: Understanding the Politics of the Global, Anwar 
explains that  
“The ending of Suharto’s rule was partly caused by his failure to understand the 
fundamental changes in the international system after the end of the Cold War.  
Suharto seemed not to have realized that with the fall of communism, his worth 
as a staunch anti-communist de facto ally of the United States and the West as a 
whole had greatly diminished in value” (Anwar, 2005, p. 219)  
The withdrawal of western financial support, coupled with the changing domestic 
political landscape resulted in his government being ousted by popular protest, and in 
very quick order – due in large part to the emergence of information and 
communications technologies - which helped circumvent the restrictions on such 
proceedings put in place by the regime (Bhakti, 2004). 
As Anwar outlines in his highlighting of the international situation, “The evidence of 
International support, as well as the economic achievements of the Suharto 
government, which improved the welfare of the Indonesian people as a whole, helped 
to mute public discontent against the New Order’s authoritarianism” (Anwar, 2005, p. 
205).  This leads directly into the Asian financial crisis, which removed the economic leg 
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of the stool for the New Order regime, and quickened the ouster of Suharto (Green, 
2005). 
At the same time, the Asian financial crisis hit, which further weakened Suharto and his 
one remaining claim of success – a stable economy.  Forced to leave office under such a 
cloud, the reformasi movement that replaced the Suharto regime had to operate in an 
environment where half measures of reform would not be tolerated and any practice 
entertained by the previous government had to be reversed – and quickly.  Kuntoro 
Mangkusubroto, head of the President's Delivery Unit on Development Monitoring and 
Oversight (UKP4), has framed the transition as one where, “In Indonesia’s case, coupling 
democracy with decentralization has set the stage for a full swing of the pendulum for a 
drastic transition within our government” (Mangkusubroto, 2013).  
The effect of having to proceed with reforms – which, in policy terms was nearly 
overnight – has produced mixed results.  While the speed of reform was seen initially as 
a good thing – as this was called for by the populous - the entire concept wasn’t 
properly thought out and implemented.  Indonesia shows us that major changes to 
government structure, coupled with little planning can have disastrous consequences.  
The Reformasi   
The Reformasi, or reform, period of transition in post-Suharto Indonesia is the era that 
replaced the New Order era.  This new era was named for the eventual reforms that 
would be its center piece – namely: decentralization; the lifting of controls over the 
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press and individual freedoms; political reforms allowing direct and free elections, to 
name a few. 
One of the major factors of concern in this period was President Habibie, who had been 
Suharto’s Vice president and who was seen by many to be a holdover from the New 
Order generation.  For the most part, Habibie did manage to push through the reforms 
that were needed to satisfy the majority, but he balked at going after Suharto for crimes 
committed during his Presidency (Cribb, 2010).  The major reforms that were tackled 
and passed were packaged together in an attempt to reverse some of the most heavy-
handed aspects of the Suharto years.     
The imperative to decentralize was communicated to Habibie by many actors; both local 
and state governments, international donor agencies, and the citizenry at large.  With a 
large amount of blame being directed towards the central government and its previous 
policies (both economic and otherwise), critics of the government were quick to call for 
decentralization in order to wrest some control away and allow for better economic 
management.  Local officials at both the provincial and sub-provincial levels were 
looking to gain controls over local resources, while sub-national governments of all 
levels were eager to take power away from the central government – remembering how 
they were treated under previous regimes.  Even the IMF and the World Bank advocated 





Law 22 and Law 25 – Decentralization reforms, 1999 
Reforms at large 
Laws 22 and 25, regional autonomy legislation, were drafted in 1999 for implementation 
in 2001 (Government of Indonesia, 1999).  These laws were designed to combat the 
highly centralized form of government that had been in place during the previous 
authoritarian regimes.  Vice President Habibie assumed the presidency and began to 
institute reforms; “These reforms included ending the small limit on the number of 
political parties, allowing East Timor to vote on independence (independence achieved 
in June 2002) and overseeing the passage of laws authorizing the decentralization of 
government” (Green, 2005, p. 4).  As can be noticed from the list, reforms were sought 
in areas of governance and democratic reform that encompassed a number of political 
areas, as well as the decentralization file.  These reforms were indeed a comprehensive 
package designed to bring change to a number of areas that had been called for by 
protestors, the populous and external actors alike. 
Breaking down the Indonesian decentralization model 
With the ‘Big Bang’ decentralization push, Indonesia introduced Laws 22 and 25.  In 
1999 the national parliament approved these two laws on decentralization. Law 22 
concerns administrative decentralization, while Law 25 concerns financial 
administration. The first set of implementing regulations for Law 22 was published early 




Law 22/1999 was intended to restructure the political and organizational arrangements 
of the sub-national government system and the relationship to central government.  The 
key features include greater autonomy of local governments (city/districts) by dissolving 
the hierarchical relationship with the province.  Local government heads would report 
to locally elected assemblies instead of to the provincial governor.  Provincial 
governments would continue to report to the central government.  In addition, 
deconcentrated units of the central ministries, except for specific (traditional) national 
responsibilities, would be transferred to the control of provinces or local governments, 
as appropriate.  The national responsibilities are defense and security, foreign policy, 
monetary and fiscal policy, judiciary affairs, and religious affairs (Brodjonegoro, 2003, p. 
2). 
Law25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between central government and the local governments 
focuses on the intergovernmental fiscal system.  Four categories of local government 
revenues are defined: Own sources; the Balance Fund; Local Loans; and Others.  The 
most significant changes are associated with the establishment of the Balance Fund.  
These changes arise from the introduction of the sharing of revenues from the 
exploitation of natural resources, and the reorganization of a transfer system.  The 
Autonomous Regional Subsidy (Subsidi Daerah Otonom, SDO) and the block Instruksi 
Presiden (INPRES, development transfers), have been subsumed into a general 
allocation fund (DAU), the total of which is set at twenty five percent of central 
government domestic revenues (Brodjonegoro, 2003, p. 3). 
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The central government specifically chose the local levels of government, either district 
or city -depending on rural or urban setting – to devolve its power, effectively bypassing 
the provincial government level6.  There were eleven mandatory functions of public 
services that fell under the local government’s purview under law 22/1999, and these 
included health, education, infrastructure, investment and environment.   
Indonesia’s law 22/1999 was primarily a political decentralization exercise, with little to 
no fiscal devolution.  Even law 25/1999, which was exclusively fiscal decentralization, for 
the most part only rearranged and combined various forms of fiscal authority into a 
couple of new streams – with little to no additional revenue, and local revenues still 
coming from the central government through the DAU transfers (Pepinsky & Wihardja, 
2011).  In subsequent updates to the laws 22 and 25, an expanded taxation capability 
was added, in recognition of the fact that a large swath of responsibilities was added to 
the local governments, with a lack of associated fiscal muscle.  This is in conjunction 
with local governments being able to directly plan and control their local budgets, which 
set them up for autonomy within their geographical areas, in policy and priority fields 




                                                          
6
 Provinces are responsible for coordinating functions among the local governments and 
performing certain roles, often evaluation functions, that the sub-provincial governments are unable to 
perform. (Green, 2005) 
57 
 
Big Bang Decentralization 
The impetus for the speed of the decentralization model that Indonesia has followed 
has been explored, and we will now move into examining the effects that have been felt 
by the suddenness of this change.   
Indonesia moved to decentralize with astounding speed.  The decentralization laws 
empowered sub-provincial governments and “were crafted without a well-developed 
transition or implementation plan” (Green, 2005, p. 3).  One of the main characteristics 
of this lack of planning was that district level public service responsibilities are 
inadequately matched to local revenues, and public accountability and strong legal 
institutions were not in place (Green, 2005). 
Local Development 
Indonesia’s decentralization has been lauded for allowing local governments the ability 
to plan and deliver services that allow for more locally-oriented development, to spend 
funds received through the DAU on local needs and requirements, enhance and direct 
regulations within the local sphere of influence, and respond quickly to the needs of 
local citizens.  There was heavy emphasis on the types of development that can now 
happen as a result of local decision making autonomy – however, the positive effects on 
Indonesia’s national economic performance have been elusive (Pepinsky & Wihardja, 




Research – A Tale of Two Practitioners 
This research takes a look at what being a development practitioner within Indonesia 
under the newly decentralized model can look like, from two separate viewpoints.  Two 
practitioners that work in different aspects of the Indonesian development sphere, were 
asked the same set of questions; both reaffirm certain data points and differ on others.  
Jeffrey Ong is a Senior Development Officer at the Embassy of Canada, and Erman 
Rahman is the Director of Local and Economic Governance Programs for the Asia 
Foundation in Indonesia.   
The set of questions that each was asked focused broadly on their experiences: 
i. Dealing with the various government agencies responsible for overseeing 
development; 
ii. Interacting with donors and development agencies; 
iii. Working with the people/villages/groups who are receiving the development 
funds; 
iv. Going through the transition to a decentralized governance model; 
v. Working within the unique Indonesian decentralized development model; 
vi. How the decentralization transition was managed; and 




Both practitioners were asked to set their commentary in a framework that took the 
decision to decentralize as a given.  This research was primarily focused on the 
operational elements of working within the current model – as their separate 
experiences would have the most relevance in terms of this work.  
These two actors present a critique to the theoretical aspects of the dominant World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund view on decentralization.  Ong and Rahman are 
working within the newly constructed Indonesian decentralized model and are thus able 
to offer a viewpoint that stands in contrast from ‘how the system was supposed to be 
setup’, versus their experiences dealing with the system from a practitioner perspective.  
It must be acknowledged however, that they present their own set organizational 
agendas that see aid delivery as the primary focus. 
The speed and direction of the decentralization that Indonesia undertook has been a 
constant narrative of both interview subjects, as well as nearly all other research that I 
was able to gather.  Beginning from the broadest perspective of the national and 
moving to lessons extrapolated from the local level, this section will focus on exploring 
the primary research that was gathered in support of Indonesia’s decentralization.  
Having refocused my research in Indonesia on the consequences of decentralization, I 
sought informed opinions and perspectives from a number of in-country observers.  
Background information, on a non-attributable basis, was provided by three people at 
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the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).  As previously discussed, two 
local aid executives agreed to share their views on an attributable basis.   
There were four broad themes that developed throughout the research process: 
1- The manner in which the transition from centralized to decentralized was carried 
out; 
2- The division of authority within the newly decentralized model; 
3- Issues surrounding relationships – Donor to government as well as within and 
amongst the various levels of government; 
4- Lessons extrapolated from the local level; 
These four broad areas will be broken into sub-sections that were all identified by the 
research participants while in the field; this will be further enhanced with supporting 
research materials.   
 
1- The manner in which the transition from centralized to decentralized was 
carried out 
As mentioned in the preceding sections, the speed of the transformation from 
centralized to decentralized was staggering, so much so that it has been coined as the 
‘Big Bang’.  The pressure on the central government to carry forward with a 
transformational agenda was intense, and the former Suharto regime’s centralized 
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grasp on power was put squarely in the crosshairs as the first order of business 
(Rahman, 2012). 
The process that took place started with the 1999 laws on decentralization, which 
stated that the focus of Indonesian decentralization would be to the district level, 
bypassing the provinces for the most part.  This was a huge jump for the country, as 
devolving to the provinces would have been tough enough, but to skip over that level 
and transfer almost directly to the districts made it even tougher.  As an additional 
complication, all areas of government were to be decentralized at the same time, 
without the planning or preparation time that would normally be associated with this 
type of transformation (Ong, 2012). 
The speed of the transition was staggering – only two years from the passage of the law 
(which was in 2000), implementation was required for all districts and provinces in 
Indonesia.  Perhaps most surprisingly, the man who pushed it all through was President 
Habibie, who was Suharto’s Vice President at the time of the changeover, and had 
assumed the Presidency on an interim basis until 1999. 
The overall process as described by Rahman can be traced directly to a lack of priorities 
“The Indonesian government’s problem is a lack of priority…trying to do everything 
rather than some things well”.  Through the following sub-section, we will explore the 




Context and rationale:   
The decision to go with a decentralized model versus a federal one was, according to 
Jeffrey Ong, a political one, and made for two main reasons: 
Rather than actually face that risk of possible separation for the country and putting 
decentralization at the level of the provinces, which could have made Provinces very 
strong at that time and possibly even caused worse kinds of implications – separation.  
Decentralization was actually focused at the district level – that was actually one of the 
pressures and was a political decision (Ong, 2012). 
Bypassing the provincial level alleviated two concerns; the threat of nationalistic 
tendencies that would be inherent in a provincial or regional power base - the areas that 
were singled out for possible independence were: East Timor, Aceh and Papua – as well, 
not to create any direct competitors for national political power, or at the very least, not 
provide provincial pulpits from which to launch political power bases.   
President Habibie also had another problem – having to be seen to be doing business in 
a new, accountable and open manner.  Habibie was at that time attempting to secure a 
full term as President (a role that he was unable to obtain, primarily because he lacked 
internal Golkar party support (Harris, 1998)) yet he had to be seen to be the opposite of 
Suharto, and this was his best chance at succeeding in that endeavor (Ong, 2012). 
One of the main transitional issues that has arisen throughout this process is the lack of 
a plan to govern the eventual transformation.  This becomes especially apparent when a 
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regulatory approach is looked at. The inconsistency of standardized regulations that 
would apply country-wide is a huge problem for the districts – couple that with the 
various versions of the regulations that have been rolled out, sometimes in the six or 
seven range over a twelve year period and it becomes even more of an issue.   
The national accounting system for local government has been updated six times, each 
time forcing a change in accounting practices.  Erman Rahman points to this as the best 
example of non-continuity: 
The inconsistency of regulations, so many regulations issued by the national 
government that applies directly to districts: makes them crazy.  While some are 
good intentioned, they keep on changing.  Once regulations are mastered, 
changes are made – some are on version six or seven – take the national 
accounting practices as the best example (Rahman, 2012). 
The inconsistency of regulations is an issue that has been brought forward throughout 
the research, and has particular relevance later in this section: within the relationships 
between the central, provincial and district governments.   
Obfuscation:   
Both Ong and Ramman mentioned a potential rationale for the way in which the 
transition was carried out.  Choosing to eliminate a robust provincial counterpart in 
decentralization has allowed the central government room to maneuver without a 
mechanism for strong oversight.   
They point to two levels of oversight that are lacking – one is the strong provincial 
presence and the other is the international donor community.  It does stand to reason 
that with over five hundred districts to deal directly with, there is little chance that 
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standards can be, or are applied evenly.  Thus, donor organizations must then simply 
deal with individual districts and not question neighbouring ones that they are not 
working with. 
Also noted is the interplay of the various central government Ministries and agencies 
that are charged with overseeing parts of the decentralized system.  Jeffrey Ong points 
out that the Cabinet oversight system is a mess: 
Most Ministries are working in silos.  The structure of Cabinet is also an issue and 
doesn’t facilitate them working closely together.  For example, the key Ministries 
involved in decentralization are Finance, Internal Affairs and planning agencies.  
Ministry of Finance and planning agencies are under Minister for Economic 
Affairs, while Ministry of Internal Affairs are under Minister of Defence, so not 
really under one roof, which hurts coordination and is not happening in a 
structured manner.  One of the challenges for donors is trying to bring all of the 
key players together. Further, many of the regulations and frameworks are 
issued by those three Ministries and they are not well harmonized, which leaves 
it up to the donors to try and work around.  What’s even worse is that the 
relevant Ministers have interpersonal relationships, not institutional ones – and 
the Secretariat that is supposed to bring them together, rarely meets and the 
council on regional autonomy doesn’t function very well (Ong, 2012). 
The idea of purposeful obfuscation is a tough one to quantify, but when looking at the 
mechanisms of coordination and oversight within the economic and development 
spheres of Indonesia, one can see why these experts have highlighted the issue as a 
possibility.  This will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter, recommendations.  
 
2 – The Division of Decentralized Authority 
As discussed in chapter one, there are three types of authorities that make up 
government structure – Fiscal, Political and Administrative.  While there are a number of 
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levers that are able to be shifted to determine the exact decentralized relationship 
amongst the various levels of government, everything is derived from these three 
authorities. Since Indonesia was a unitary state, a devolved structure was implemented 
as power derived from three authorities had to flow down from its source, the 
constitution.    
The type of decentralized environment can vary widely, and is directly correlated to the 
powers that are granted within the three types of authorities.  For example, and within 
the early Indonesian decentralized context (laws 22/25 1999) there was political and 
administrative granting, but not fiscal.  And even within this model, a large portion of 
the administrative oversight resided with the provinces (while also removing the 
provinces from previous, direct supervisory role over districts), thus further diluting any 
clear reporting structure.  
When discussing this aspect of the decentralization with Jeffrey Ong, he framed it in this 
way: “people actually need to understand the context of an archipelagic nation: with 
more than 16,000 islands, 32 provinces [it] is very difficult to manage it from that 
[national] level” (Ong, 2012).  He went on to further explain what the changes actually 
mean on for the average citizen, and what they are looking for out of this process “The 
idea of the district level is the closest level of government to the people, as such, also 
the expectation [is there] for the improvement of services”  (Ong, 2012). 
The importance of maintaining the unity of the country, while at the same time allowing 
certain authority at the local level for services to be improved, is a fine balance.  There 
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was a general consensus for having the control over defence, finance, foreign affairs, 
religious affairs and the legal/judicial system remain with the central government (Alm, 
Aten, & Bahl, 2001). 
The speed with which the Indonesian process was carried out had a negative impact on 
the planning and implementation processes, but surprisingly did not lead to the 
wholesale chaos that was predicted.  According to Mr. Ong, it went relatively smoothly, 
with some areas (both districts and provinces) managing it better than others (Ong, 
2012).     
With political authority as a key component of the decentralization model to the district 
level - partly to bypass the provinces for political purposes and partly to get as close as 
possible to the people – created a democratic spirit that gave the people some hope, 
and helped carry them through the rough patches (Ong, 2012).  Having the political 
reforms along with decentralization has managed to satisfy the population to a 
remarkable degree and as Jeffrey Ong opines “That’s why people think it’s a 
combination of opening up democracy within decentralization: it opened up feudal 
culture and helps make it easier” (Ong, 2012). 
The official law states that decentralization is at the district level – although there are 
roles and expectations for provincial governments.  A few provincial governments and 
the Sultanate of Yogyakarta have engaged the people and have managed the transition 
very well (this will be further referenced further in the section on lessons learned from 
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the local level), whereas most provinces have not fully embraced their new roles and are 
being bypassed (Ong, 2012). 
On paper, the initial provincial expectations were to supervise and facilitate equal 
distribution amongst the districts, with some financial and administrative oversight of 
the various funds that support development.  Initially the laws were not very robust, 
however the recent changes have strengthened the role of the provincial government to 
make it more of an agent of the national government.  The current arrangement 
provides the provincial government with a mandate to represent the national 
government at the district level and help manage and supervise the districts (Ong, 
2012). 
The initial laws: 22/25 1999 provide for regional autonomy (law 22) and decentralization 
(law 25), were revised to become: laws 32/33 2004 and were changed to encompass the 
economy (law 32) and fiscal decentralization (law 33) (Ong, 2012).   The 2004 laws 
granted more authority to the provinces in terms of budgetary and regulatory review 
(prior to implementation), however there remained limitations.  According to Erman 
Rahman, “There was still not enough authority [granted] to provinces, especially within 
the education and health sectors, where they remained completely removed.  This 2004 
update did however grant them authority over the provincial roads, which was welcome 
and needed” (Rahman, 2012).  Rahman argues that with standards being set by the 
central government, and carried out by the local government, “Provinces don’t have 
anything to do in the end other than to distribute [already allocated] money to the 
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district governments….In terms of the division of authority, that’s the main weakness of 
the system” (Rahman, 2012). 
Both Raman and Ong agree that in the end, having a strong provincial government is 
unlikely to happen, even though it is possible to pull the authority from the district to 
the provincial level.  “For sure they [central government] do not want provincial 
governments to play roles against them, so that’s the difficulty with pulling authority 
back from district to provincial” (Ong, 2012).  “The idea was that power could be taken 
back but [that] has never happened.  Why would it after used to having it for so long?” 
(Rahman, 2012).    
Ong also points to the issue of uniform resource allocation, or re-allocation, which is 
supposed to be one of the main roles of the strengthened provincial government.  He 
notes that there is a growing concern that those local governments that are rich in 
natural resources are maintaining their own wealth without the interests of sharing it 
with their neighbouring regions.  He maintains that “This is an issue actually – even now 
those rich districts have not really shared their benefits outside their borders” (Ong, 
2012).  This is one obvious critique of a weak watchdog provincial level that has little or 
no power to enforce its mandate of oversight. 
2.1 Taxation, Finances  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the various levers of authority (fiscal, 
administrative, political) are able to be pulled in different configurations, depending on 
what decentralized relationship is sought.  The complex relationships at play between 
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these three authorities dictates the outcome of the equation.  Within the Indonesian 
context, there was a very deliberate balancing of the fiscal ratio almost totally in favour 
of the national government.  As Erman Rahman clearly states the case, “Tax collection, 
which is still maintained by the central government and distributed to [its subsidiary] 
levels was not devolved, which would have created real autonomy for the lower levels” 
(Rahman, 2012). 
The current arrangement has the districts receiving three financial transfers within the 
fiscal decentralized framework (Silver, Azis, & Schroeder, 2001). 
1 – General allocation (purpose) fund, this is block program funding used for routine 
expenditures such as salaries; 
2 – Specific grants, used for initiatives that are considered as a priority by the national 
government which are to be implemented at the local level; 
3 – Shared revenue, these are revenues gained by the local government for their natural 
resources such as mining and forestry. 
There is an additional source of income: Permits are also a form of revenue but are 
regulated by all levels of government.  A very complex and important issue, a full look at 
the permitting landscape can be found within the Master’s thesis of Lisa Courtney-
Mercer.  This excerpt on forestry permitting is particularly poignant for the purposes of 
this research surrounding revenues and overlapping authorities: 
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The classification of forests correlates with the permits required for particular 
operations within Indonesia’s forests. These permits are ambiguous at best. 
Forest permits are designed to support the classification of forest as a means to 
manage forest operations. The difficultly with this permit system stems from 
overlapping areas of forest classification, disputes over classification areas, 
unrecognized land rights and customary lands of the Dayak people. Further 
complicating the issues of permits are poor and outdated regulatory maps of 
Indonesia’s forests.  The disconnect between agencies throughout Indonesia’s 
decentralized government has led to multiple permits being granted in a single 
area. Corruption is extremely widespread within Indonesia’s forestry sector 
where permits are require but can also be purchased from several different 
offices of authority at varying levels of government. It is not uncommon for one 
specific area to be permitted for contradictory operations. This is one of the 
major problems Indonesia faces in forest management, and a critical factor in 
the protection of Indonesia’s forest. These problems are amplified by the 
discrepancy in mapping areas, disputed land ownership, classification 
designations and through the sale of permits for forest activities by multiple 
actors (Courtney-Mercer, 2013, p. 51) 
This will be covered further in section 3 (relationships).  
From 2001 to 2012, in terms of the allocation of funds, there were only the three 
funding sources mentioned above, which were considered by local governments to be 
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inadequate to meet their full funding needs.  This led to a situation where districts were 
actually encouraged to form in order to obtain access to these revenues.  The way that 
they distribute, according to the formula, creates incentives for local governments to 
split: “Districts have almost doubled in the last ten years, which is ridiculous….this can 
be for districts in the same local area that don’t really need to split but game the 
system” (Rahman, 2012). 
Seemingly, one of the most frustrating issues for district level governments was the 
changing and duplication of the financial oversight of the central government revenues.  
For example, the autonomous general accounting principles were regulated by three 
departments in separate ways – a consequence of the silos of government departments, 
according to Jeffrey Ong.  “Most ministries have accounting mandates for local 
government [for monies received from the national ministries], the Development Audit 
Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs all have separate 
ways to account [under the same principles], which was not supposed to be the way it 
worked, but they were not well coordinated”  (Ong, 2012).  Further, this was coupled 
with revisions of accounting and policy frameworks that are required by local 
governments. “Local governments learn the processes and the national government 
changes it on them” (Ong, 2012). 
2.2 Corruption 
Along with the division of authority, both in terms of financial and administrative 
authorities, comes the division of corruption.  The common consensus was that ‘more 
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people are taking less’ and was mainly due to two factors: a lack of supervision, 
discussed above, that allows it to happen as well as a reliance on one main agency 
(Ministry of National Affairs) to monitor all local governments, without oversight from 
the provincial actors.    
 The issue of corruption and the effects that the local governments – specifically the 
leader and democratization of the local government -  have on combatting it will be 
more fully described in section 3 (relationships), but it is also important to highlight the 
issue in this section as the decentralized nature of the current structure directly impacts 
this issue.    
Mr. Rahman believes that decentralization has moved corruption to the various levels of 
authority.  He maintains however that it is easier to monitor at the local level, which is 
why his, and other development NGO’s prefer to do their work at the local level.  He 
highlights the shifting nature of the corruption in a particularly poignant manner “If we 
were minimalists, we would say that a local corruption model is still better than villas in 
France, which is what it was with the national corruption model” (Rahman, 2012). 
3 Relationships – Donor-to-Government and National/Provincial/Regional Interplay 
The donor-to-government relationship in Indonesia is a complex one.  Officially, all 
donors must work through the central government to fund their projects, but there are 
workarounds in place for almost all established development agencies.  There is a 
serious lack of multi-year planning, or of adhering to a plan if there is one in place.  
73 
 
Couple all of this with the changing nature of donor priorities and the relationship 
becomes unwieldy for both donor and recipient. 
3.1 The Donor focus 
All of this must be put into an initial context however.  Indonesia is a non-aid dependent 
country, with less than 1% of its GDP coming from development funds.  Rather, it is 
seeking relationships through its bilateral and donor partners.  These relationships are 
“well appreciated by the Indonesian government as they wish to learn more from their 
international partners” (Ong, 2012).   
Donor countries are continually refining their own strategic goals when it comes to their 
aid dollars.  Those bilateral relationships are also shifting in Indonesia, and are starting 
to move away from the previous focus on service delivery as Indonesia shifts to lower 
middle income status.  I observed a general move towards two types of aid funding: 
1 – Specific project funding; often with strict conditions attached to location, outcomes, 
ideology and implementation.  This type of funding is becoming more prevalent as the 
home constituency of the donor program comes into play.  For example, the Australian 
aid agency (AusAID) is the largest donor to Indonesia, and as a key geopolitical partner, 
it often dictates the types and locations of the projects to align with Australian domestic 
issues, whether those are security, economic or territorial in nature. 
2 – Issue-based funding and civil service training partnerships.  This type of funding, 
(e.g., for climate change and mentoring) is attractive to donor governments as they can 
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focus on the issue that matter to their home constituency and domestic market.  The 
training component is particularly relevant with the addition of so many local 
governments now being responsible for service delivery.   
The Ministry of National Affairs (MONA) has the authority to monitor local 
development.  They have created a framework that is, according to Erman Rahman 
“both stupid and complicated, while at the same time they [insist on] creating their own 
indicators for the projects that are brought to them [with indicators built in]” (Rahman, 
2012).  
Rahman, whose organization, The Asia Foundation, has many contracts with donors to 
oversee projects and steer them through the various bureaucracies, does not mince 
words with his evaluation of the effectiveness of the system within which he works.  
“There’s an example of a AusAID project on schools that was unsuccessful as all levels of 
government kept their own outcomes and numbers and there was no coordination, 
which they did intentionally in order not to be held to account” (Rahman, 2012) 
Rahman maintains that NGO reliance on monitoring is extreme, and remains a barrier to 
effective aid delivery.  Couple this with the donors getting out of the service delivery 
aspects and into mentoring of the civil service and help with policy, and Rahman sees a 
problem:  
“to me that’s bullshit – from the Bank’s perspective, they have two ways to provide 
loans to the country, one is direct support and the second is a special investment loan 
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for project specific funding.  The banking sector is so complicated that it makes specific 
investment difficult, and international donor organizations found it so tough to navigate 
– which was purposeful by Indonesia in order to have little oversight but still receive the 
money” (Rahman, 2012). 
He posits that the results of this are that the projects are not implemented as outlined 
due to the system, which still brings in the foreign aid money to Indonesia.  And this, 
along with the change to lower middle income status was used as a reason to provide 
more project funding rather than direct support (Rahman, 2012).           
With the mandated entry of aid through the national level, along with the World Bank’s 
rules against direct funding, donors are forced to work through the government’s 
unwieldy system.  Even bilaterals don’t have the experience managing the process so 
end up providing funding to organizations such as the Asia Foundation, without going 
through the national budget process.  Donors have pushed back and are working around 
the budget process as this provides them with little or no oversight and capacity to 
monitor corruption: “it’s hard not to follow the government’s request to use the budget 
system, but corrupt system [is] still in place so donors use NGO’s to circumvent” 
(Rahman, 2012). 
Jeffrey Ong takes a slightly different view, suggesting that donors are not concentrating 
on the policy and mentoring, so much as picking the ‘low hanging fruit’.  “There’s a 
regional look at where those aid dollars can be focused to approach and support the 
easy successes.  This would place the Canadian International Development Agency 
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(CIDA), whose financial resources are modest, on par with many organizations that are 
looking to maximize their aid dollars by working where success is most easily possible, in 
CIDA’s case, the Province of Sulawesi, whose choice is also supported by Indonesia” 
(Ong, 2012).  
Ong points to the Canadian government’s own commitments using existing capacity 
rather than building new infrastructure and experiences and also references an “untying 
of [aid] resources and opening up our project bids to non-Canadian firms….some 
projects have gone that way – not fully.  The principle is, best resources we can get, we 
get” (Ong, 2012).   
On the changing nature of donor aid, specifically within the second category of issue 
based and civil service training partnerships, Ong comments that “Many donors have 
seen that there are huge needs for development support – particularly at the local level 
– with so many local governments to work with” (Ong, 2012).  Thus, there is a direct 
cause and effect relationship of decentralization having moved service delivery 
functions to the local level. 
One of the major themes arising from the research, and explored at length in earlier 
sections, is the lack of planning that went into the ‘Big Bang’ decentralization.  Planning 
still seems to be a problem, even after the decentralization process, and has perhaps 
suffered due to the lack of forethought at the beginning of the process.  Again, 
Indonesia’s lack of planning, coupled with donor agencies changing their five and ten 
year plans, has caused further disorganization within the aid sphere. 
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“[It is] frustrating to deal with the Indonesian government, especially multi-year 
planning – the central government can talk about medium term but there is no follow 
through on the ground.  [This is] partly due to democratic systems and [associated] 
election cycles” (Rahman, 2012). 
3.2 Overall mood within the development sphere 
The overall mood within Indonesia’s development sphere seems to be one of 
scattershot progress.  Donor priorities are ever changing, creating donor disconnect, no 
consistency and a haphazard approach.  From one year to the next, chasing donor 
money with the moving goalposts of priorities can be difficult and time consuming.  Not 
being helped by clarity on the donor end isn’t aiding the issue: “Donor policy statements 
are so general, they are tough to operationalize…all of this combined makes 
development very difficult” (Rahman, 2012).    
In Rahman’s opinion, the government of Indonesia is “not strong with donors, and can’t 
think [coherently articulate] what it wants to do…Indonesian government of all layers 
have different priorities – even amongst the President and Minister of Finance – there’s 
no single voice of government, which really makes things more difficult” (Rahman, 
2012).    
With development partners moving away from a focus on governance and into their 
chosen areas such as climate change and the mentoring of civil servants, a worrying 
trend is developing, according to Rahman:  
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To me, the biggest problem with Indonesia’s development is corruption – all 
aspects of corruption.  The public service is corrupt; doctors billing for 8 hours 
when working 2; bribes for licenses; no MRT [Mass Rapid Transit, or subway] in 
Jakarta due to corruption; floods in Jakarta due to corruption and contracts – the 
focus too much on aid capacity building – trying to improve participatory 
planning process – which at the end of the day, doesn’t mean anything…non-
effective solutions for development  (Rahman, 2012). 
Rahman sees this trend as one of aid partners not wanting to see things through.  Saying 
enough has been done in governance is a symptom of wanting to move towards the 
new world development paradigm instead of sticking with it and making an impact.  He 
also worries that once the spotlight is off governance and corruption, the corruption will 
start to gain traction again (Rahman, 2012).  
3.3 Development relationships amongst levels of government 
On paper, donor agencies cannot go straight to the local level, and must provide funding 
through Jakarta, who then provides it to the districts for the project.  While it is possible 
to provide technical assistance to the district level, money cannot be given.  What 
further complicates this process is the system to transfer donor money from central 
government to district level is not in place (Rahman, 2012). 
Rahman points to an example of a project that he was working on while at the World 
Bank “We offered money to reform local institutions and they wanted to send money to 
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that pilot area, but [the Ministry of] Finance had no mechanism to accomplish this” 
(Rahman, 2012). 
At the very least, the system does not appear to be well established for donors to 
channel funds to local governments, where the majority of donors wish to work, “as 
evaluations are easier and can be monitored effectively” (Rahman, 2012). 
As mentioned in the preface to section three, there are some workarounds in place, one 
of which is to work with districts without giving them the funds, in the form of technical 
guidance, but even that is subject to central oversight and decision making oversight 
(Rahman, 2012).  The other is to transfer money to NGOs who are already in place on 
projects, and can usually bypass some existing structural oversight (Ong, 2012).        
4 Lessons extrapolated from the local level 
One of the great experiences from the in-country research was going to Yogyakarta – a 
cultural marvel in central Java.  We landed in Indonesia and went straight to Jogja (as it 
is called in Indonesia) over the New Year’s week and managed to visit the beautiful 
temple sites of Borobudur and Prambanan – both United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world heritage sites.          
 While there, I became fascinated by the fact that Yogyakarta was a Sultanate, in fact 
the only one in the country, and declared as Yogyakarta Special Region – granted due to 
the help provided during the struggle for independence from the Dutch.  What struck 
me about the lasting nature of this Sultanate, in the context of the decentralization that 
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was taking place, was that the local population seemed to be the Sultan’s biggest 
supporters.  Person after person would remark that he was a great leader and had done 
wonders for the area.  So, I asked Ong and Rahman about this case, and they echoed 
many of the statements, and expanded on what this means within the development 
context.   
One of the benefits of the decentralized model has been the adoption of innovative best 
practices at the local level.  With the increased democratization that has gone hand in 
hand with decentralization, local governments have had to earn the support of the 
citizens for continued electoral prosperity.  While this is not the case for the Sultan, as 
by definition, he is in the role without standing for election, he still has to contend with 
securing this position from scrutiny – and by all accounts, relishes the autonomy, and 
uses it to advantage for his citizens  (Ong, 2012). 
Local governments have been given the freedom to manage themselves, and some local 
governments have been more successful than others.  As a result, those governments 
can provide better services to their citizens and better economic growth; “you can do 
bad things, or good things; depends on the leader” (Rahman, 2012). 
Further, best practices are being shared and donors are targeting this area for help.  
Champions of local leadership, such as the Sultan and others, are creating the 
environment for peer pressure to work on their surrounding districts, thus emanating 
from successful districts outwards, as more and more citizens see what the possibilities 
are within this new model (Ong, 2012). 
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Some local governments are really doing well, says Rahman “you can see the difference 
– if you have a good leader, then you are in luck.   Three examples are: the leaders of 
Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Soyo, [who] have done a lot of things that would not have 
been possible if still in an authoritarian state” (Rahman, 2012). 
Under Suharto, it was difficult to monitor corruption and hold officials to account.  Now, 
with the leaders relying on political support, “you can watch them and hold them 
accountable, under Suharto is was really difficult to keep track or to encourage people 
to monitor their representatives” (Rahman, 2012). 
What is still lacking, according to both men, is a robust civil society.  Part of this is 
attributed to the implications of essentially creating a culture of monitoring, and that as 
a whole, it has not had success in the past within the country and people find it hard to 
believe that it ever will.  “With that mentality it is very hard to create accountability – 
there is a non-confrontational culture in general and people have been beaten down 
over the years to not expect good outcomes or change” (Rahman, 2012).    
The positives are certainly there in some districts however, and the signs are improving.  
“If you are lucky to have a good leader at the district level, there is a possibility to make 
things better” (Rahman, 2012).  This is mainly due to political accountability being at the 
local level; and by empowering the local governments, service are easier to access.  
Couple this with a sense of belonging to the political process, and there’s a definite 




Chapter 4 – Analysis and discussion 
The evidence to support the notion of a rushed and harassed decentralization process is 
fairly clear.  I have explored the circumstances surrounding this decision and have 
outlined the effects that it had on a number of fronts of the Indonesian development, 
political and social spheres.  I now provide some commentary on these aspects in order 
to draw them all together and complete the picture.   
While decentralization was not a runaway success in many of the areas that I examined, 
neither was it an unmitigated disaster, falling in the middle ground of ‘good idea with 
poor planning’.  Speed, follow through, oversight and attitudinal change are the chief 
culprits hobbling the full potential on what is a very important turning point for the 
people of Indonesia. 
This chapter will mirror the research chapter in its layout and will be ordered within the 
same four broad themes; The manner in which the transition from centralized to 
decentralized was carried out; The division of authority within the newly decentralized 
model; Issues surrounding relationships – Donor to government as well as within and 






1 – The manner in which the transition from centralized to decentralized was carried 
out 
The transition process is the crux of the problem and has never really been corrected.  
The two main elements that lead to as yet unresolved issues are:  The speed at which it 
was conducted and the focus of the transition being to the district level. 
We know that a major factor in pushing the decentralization agenda forward so quickly 
was the Structural Adjustment program that was put in place as a condition of the 
financial aid from the IMF.  Once the decision to decentralize was made however, the 
process was owned by Indonesia, and was done so quickly as to omit the crucial 
‘planning’ portion of the process. 
Often in politics and government, it is hard to go after sacred programs or to attempt to 
change the public’s perception of an issue.  Time and again a government will avoid 
dealing with poor public policy in lieu of the status quo as it is often very costly to 
change entrenched attitudes on an issue. 
This holds true in Indonesia.  If everything that Suharto did was bad, hence everything 
opposite must be good.  In other words, the pendulum swung wildly away from 
centralization and will remain there until leadership decides to correct it.     
Going back towards a middle road between the two, while perhaps better public policy, 
is still closer to an imagined Suharto than a citizenry with long memories would like to 
be.  The speed of the transition effectively swung the pendulum so far that it is still 
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anathema to have it swing back.  Having solid research that shows where the balance 
should or could lay, is a start to overcoming the emotional aspects of the policy. 
2 – The Division of Decentralized Authority  
One of the other aspects of the transition, this one intentional, was to not transfer fiscal 
authority to the devolved areas.  There was and is a purposeful landscape created that is 
both confusing and damaging.  Allowing regions the authority and responsibility of 
funding their mandates is something that must be considered.  Having arms of different 
levels of government responsible for various functions is a recipe that has been shown 
to be a disaster, and with which Indonesia is currently living.  If the district level is the 
closest level to the people, that level should have the power to see through its policies 
for service improvement.  
Decentralization has benefited the districts, and to a lesser extent the provinces.  The 
freedom to operate, even within the constraints of the system, have allowed these 
areas to grow and tailor their approach to the needs of the citizenry.  This is especially 
necessary when looking at Indonesia’s geography – as the varied regions and areas have 
different concerns and demands of their local governments. 
 Jakarta has not truly allowed a locally-owned revenue stream.  Having the revenue to 
back up the policy and operational authority of the districts will be a key addition, if that 
is ever granted.  This is currently a huge loss for the districts as this limiting factor does 
not allow them to put the full weight of district resources where they would like.     
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A better allocation of responsibilities for each level of government must be realized.  
Governments should focus on their areas of strength and have strict areas of 
responsibility.  A further look at the constitution to enshrine these responsibilities into 
law is a good start.   
One of the main complaints expressed by the local governments is the requirement to 
‘be all things to all people’.  This is particularly evident in the auditing and oversight 
processes that have evolved into a mass of requirements that all must be fulfilled.  This 
takes time and energy away from program delivery and makes programs confusing, 
often having to follow so many different rules that they aren’t effective. 
The issue of corruption is one that all governments must deal with, to one degree or 
another.  Within the Indonesian context, there was some evidence of a lessening of the 
outrageous, billion dollar embezzlement, having been replaced by the ‘more people 
taking less’ syndrome.  The commissions established to look into the matter have 
proven fairly ineffectual (Rahman, 2012).  It is likely that only an increase in the civil 
society or media actors will truly have an impact on wide-spread corruption. 
3 – Relationships, Donor to Government and National/Provincial/Regional  
In terms of development, the processes in place for donors and actors to work in 
Indonesia are not great.  A convoluted system forces donors through rigid access points 
with little say in how and where funds are used.  Rethinking of this relationship should 
be a priority.   
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If the stated aim is more for the relationships, and less for about the funding, then 
improving this system will necessarily also improve the relationships.  Necessitating 
workarounds in order to make projects viable is a fact of life in many developing 
countries.  Indonesia seems to know that it isn’t a great system, yet doesn’t alter it.  
Perhaps this would be the most frustrating aspect of development work within the 
country. 
Another frustration that was apparent is the lack of planning over the medium and long 
terms.  Donors and donor governments require a consistent approach to policy and 
development and need security in which to invest and plan.   
Donors are not blameless here either.  They have their own shifting focus that wreaks 
havoc with specific project funding, as it is easily as important for Indonesian entities to 
have the consistency and commitment of donors for their own purposes.  The shifting 
nature of donors and the lack of planning have created a truly bizarre environment for 
development in the country.  Often donors are able to insist on their priorities being 
dominant - as they are providing the funding - thus all types of domestic donor priorities 
are projected to the work done on the ground in Indonesia, creating a confusing overlay 






4 – Lessons Learned from the Local Level 
This was perhaps the most aspirational aspect of the research for me.  The interviewees 
as well as local folks that I met all conceded that in a lot of ways things were better than 
under Suharto.  It is easy to lose the perspective when looking at development and 
decentralization through a critical lens, but people are better off when they aren’t 
subject to an authoritarian regime – that’s progress however you define it.  The local 
level is where the action is and where development can really happen in this country.   
One of the concepts that was addressed was the issue of peer pressure and the effects 
that a true reformer might have, not only on their district, but also on surrounding 
districts and even the province as a whole.  This is exciting as folks are going around the 
formal channels and processes to access quality leadership and best practices. 
The concept of peer pressure and good or poor governance is the real positive takeaway 
from almost everyone.  The success or failure of districts is coming down to honest hard 
work and a focus on the community rather than the leaders.  That is surely an indication 







Chapter 5 – Conclusion and Recommendations 
The concepts raised in this work have explored the central issues within the Indonesian 
development context.  Following an overview of the country and its association with 
centralization, I continue with an exploration of the Indonesian decentralized model, 
using input from highly knowledgeable practitioners and researchers on the ground.   
Again, readers are reminded that the conclusions that are drawn here are from a 
perspective to enhance aid delivery and are suggested by practitioners as opposed to 
theorists.  There are some suggested recommendations that would put more aid 
acceptance within the purview of local actors.  This makes perfect sense from a ground 
level perspective, however, while not the stated intent – they do clash with some 
theoretical aspects of development theory on state autonomy and sovereignty.  
It was encouraging to be able to study a country that has made strides with both 
development and what some would term democratization.  Too often in our field of 
study, we see examples of countries who don’t have the resources or the immediate 
capability to implement a policy shift of this magnitude and be successful.   
Better governance at all levels is critical for Indonesia to really move forward on the 
development file.  While decentralization has been shown to be a net benefit for 
districts – as it allows a large increase in political and administrative autonomy over the 
local area – there still remains a governance overhaul that must fully take into account 
the interplay between the various levels – and even them out for maximum benefit.  
While this may be difficult to do for political and historical reasons, it will be important 
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to alleviate the conflicting authorities, rules and regulations that surround the 
development sector.  
All told, Indonesia appears to be successful and continues to demonstrate a 
perseverance towards the laudable goals of increased human rights, a better economic 
future for its citizens, and hopefully an easier and less intrusive development system 
(Green, 2005).  The central coordinating bodies must reliably remain nationalized, but 
within defined windows of scope, Indonesia should allow other levels of government to 
exercise control over what they deem to be the needs of their citizens.  In a 
development context, this could lead to better outcomes for both the citizenry and the 
governments at all levels.  The recommendations below are geared towards making this 
goal achievable. 
1 – The manner in which the transition from centralized to decentralized was carried 
out 
Both the pace and the marked departure from the previous developmental and 
governance models are at the heart of this transition.  With little planning, almost totally 
devoid of any provincial and local participation, a comprehensive and strategic system 
to manage the transition was not set up. 
Proper goals and outcome monitoring, along with more consultation is required for any 
meaningful and impactful changes.  The recommendations below attempt to put some 
criteria around the next steps that need to be taken in order to progress on the 
decentralization path.  
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Recommendations:        
1.1 – Create a true partner for development at the provincial level.  This will allow for a 
regional vision to be set in place, as well as for an equal level of oversight and service 
standards.  A true provincial regulating partner with resources with the capacity to act 
both politically and monetarily will go a long way towards levelling the current unequal 
playing field.  This will also create the conditions that would support purchasing through 
economies of scale, rather than through each district for one-off purchases. 
1.2 - Develop medium and long term development plans with input from all levels of 
government and stakeholders.  The lack of a proper implementation plan at the outset, 
along with shifting priorities, has left a fractured decentralized model.  A gathering of 
the threads and teasing them into a consistent approach is required.  This would allow 
government to maintain a stable course of action, to avoid such problems as the 
currently ever-changing national accounting and regulatory system. 
1.3 – Appoint one main Cabinet Minister responsible for provincial and district affairs.  
This will lead to the elimination of a fractured oversight system, and will also decrease 
the silos that have are being created and maintained in all aspects of the governmental 
development process.  This would also have the benefit of focusing donors’ attention 





2 – The Division of Decentralized Authority  
Since the implementation of the decentralized model, some good work has been done 
to hone the scope of authority within the system.  This needs to continue, with a more 
fully participatory approach from all actors involved to properly delineate the levels of 
authority, oversight and management. 
System capacity at the various levels is perhaps the overarching narrative that should 
come out of a proposed review, critically looking at which levels should be assuming the 
roles of implementation, oversight and planning.  Once determined, steps should be 
taken to minimize the jurisdictional overlap that currently exists within the system, and 
the recommendations below are an attempt to help clean up that area of the model.    
Recommendations: 
2.1 – Devolve limited fiscal and taxation power to the level of political and 
administrative power.  There simply must be a matching level of fiscal control to provide 
the ability to carry out the policies of the devolved areas.  Reliance on higher levels of 
government for funding of local priorities is a tough nut to crack and has not been 
successful for Indonesian districts since the decentralization process began. 
2.2 – Conduct a full and overarching review of the decentralized system.  Determine the 




2.3 – Create a single permitting agency to oversee all aspects of the resource extraction 
permitting process, with representation from all levels of government as well traditional 
use advocates that would represent those living on the land.  The current arrangement 
of all levels permitting for resource extraction and use is a real problem, both 
environmentally and in terms of acting at cross purposes.  This needs to be solved and a 
balance struck. 
2.4 – Close the loophole that allows districts to split and receive almost double the 
funding and allow provinces to regulate districts.  More focus should be put towards 
improving service in the current configuration, and perhaps even rolling back the 
current amount after a proper reckoning of what constitutes a district.  This will both 
save money and avoid duplication. 
2.5 – Consolidate the audit requirements which currently reside within all funding and 
oversight agencies into a single process or agency. 
2.6 – Emphasize merit based advancement within the civil service.  This will go a long 
way to reducing the corruption issue, and increase having the best people in place to do 
the job. 
2.7 – Create a Districts Association.  There should be an advocacy group that is formed 
of and for the districts, similar to the Canadian model of the Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities (FCM).  Creating one voice that could negotiate and advocate for the 
districts would be an advantage for its members. 
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3 – Relationships, Donor to Government and National/Provincial/Regional  
This section attempts to help clean up the barriers to entry and poor coordination of 
international actors trying to work within Indonesia.  The current system has become a 
behemoth that is very difficult to manage and work within, which both slows and 
decreases the effectiveness of the projects. 
Other components that emerged have been the need for Indonesian society to take a 
lead role in fostering a truly open media and civil society actors.  Having strong voices at 
the table to expose excess and keep the citizenry at the forefront of the government’s 
thinking can only benefit the country’s decentralization efforts and help to focus those 
efforts towards compromise and outcomes that work for all Indonesians.    
Recommendations: 
3.1 – Donor refocus back onto the governance issue as a priority.  This will help tackle 
corruption while supporting and training the civil service on how to be a more 
professional and effective entity.  The civil service mentoring and coaching programs 
that are being conducted by FCM - helping to guide Indonesian municipalities and local 
governments - are a good example of the work that should be continuing, however with 
more emphasis on good governance.  These two areas can be combined quite easily and 
should be worked on in tandem. 
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3.2 – A true opening up of media access to government and protection of the media’s 
powers of publishing without fear of government retaliation.  Only a truly free media 
will be able to help expose wrongdoing: this can only benefit the citizens at large. 
3.3 – Fostering of civil society in a meaningful way.  More emphasis needs to be put on 
the creation of the middle class and civil society.  This is still a very fledgling group 
within the country and its solidification will greatly enhance public oversight and start to 
draw down the inequality gap. 
3.4 – Allow donor agencies to work more directly with projects and less through a 
centrally directed approach.  This will negate the necessity for the workarounds and 
focus the energy on the projects and the development needs. 
4 – Lessons Learned from the Local Level 
As we have seen throughout this work, there has been friction between the various 
layers of government.  With the powers necessarily being granted by the national 
authority to both the provinces and the regions, it becomes critical to allow those two 
entities to develop their own areas of expertise, and help them to standardize and 
implement solutions across the country. 
The recommendations below focus on providing those closest to the people an 
opportunity to share and codify what they are experiencing into a proper support 
system.  A top-down approach for change will not sufficiently address the needs of 




4.1 – Creation of a ‘best practices’ institute that will allow districts to share and 
implement their successes.   
4.2 – Encouragement from the central government to mandate successful program 
implementation throughout the country or in large scale tests, perhaps working through 
the ‘best practices’ institute. 
4.3 – Further strengthening of the laws on local electoral reform, studying what has 
worked in successful areas.  
4.4 – More resources dedicated towards establishing a robust and renewed civil society.  
Part of this will require opening access to the internal workings of government and 
conducting business in the open so that the citizenry is able to view what is being done 
on their behalf.  
5 – Comparing Data and Recommendations     
As Indonesia moves along its path of decentralization, it would be useful to conduct 
some more research after the conclusion of its next five year development plan, to 
gauge whether these recommendations - if implemented - have had any measured 
effect.  The creation of the next five year plan is a nice medium term look, and will likely 
have some data to suggest how effective any of these steps have been.   
This research has demonstrated, I hope, that there is a complete necessity of having 
sufficient political will for the implementation of ambitious and structural change.  That 
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demonstration of continuing along the development path, in tandem with 
decentralization, should be visible and accounted for through a further study in the next 



























Agrawal, A., & Ribot, J. (1999). Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with South Asian 
and West African Environmental Cases. The Journal of Developing Areas, 33, 473-502. 
Ahmad, E., & Mandoor, A. (2002). Indonesia: Managing Decentralization. Washington: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Alm, J., Aten, R., & Bahl, R. (2001). Can Indonesia Decentralize Successfully? Plans, Problems and 
Prospects. Indonesian Economic Studies Journal Impact Factor & Information, 37(1), 83-
102. 
Anwar, D. F. (2005). The Fall of Suharto: Understanding the Politics of the Global. In F. L. Wah, & 
J. Ojendal, Southeast Asian Response to Globalization: Restructuring Governance and 
Deepening Democracy (pp. 201-229). Singapore: Nias Press. 
Asian Development Bank. (2006). Country Strategy and program:Indonesia 2006-2009. Manila: 
Asian Development Bank. 
Barclay, H. (1990). People Without Government: An Anthropology of Anarchy. Seattle: Left Hand 
Books. 
Barr, C. (2001). Banking on Sustainability: Structural Adjustment and Forestry Reform in Post-
Suharto Indonesia. Bogor: Center for International Forestry Research. 
Bhakti, I. N. (2004). The Transition to Democracy in Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems. In J. 
Rolfs, The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition (pp. 195-206). Honolulu: Asia Pacific 
Center for Security Studies. 
Bhattacharya, A., & Pengeshu, M. (1997). Indonesia: Development Transformation and the Role 
of Public Policy. In D. Leipziger, Lessons from East Asia (pp. 387-442). Ann Arbour: The 
University of Michigan Press. 
Brautigam, D., & Knack, S. (2004). Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52(2), 255-285. 
Brodjonegoro, B. (2003). The Indonesian Decentralization After the Law Revision: Towards a 
Better Future? Jakarta: University of Indonesia. 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network . (n.d.). Rationale for 
Decentralization. Retrieved 12 14, 2012, from The Online Sourcebook on 




Centre for International Environmental Law. (2002). Whose Resources? Whose Common Good? 
Towards a New Paradigm of Environmental Justice and the National Interest of 
Indonesia. Washington: Centre for International Environmental Law. 
Chase-Dunn, C. K. (1997). Rise and Demise: Comparing World Systems. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Cheema, G., & Rondinelli, D. (2007). Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and 
Practices. Cambridge, MA: The Brookings Institution Press. 
Colman, A. M. (1995). Game Theory and its Applications in the Social and Biological Sciences. 
Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Conyers, D. (1984). Decentralization and Development: A Review of the Literature. Public 
Administration and Development, 4, 187-197. 
Courtney-Mercer, L. (2013). A Case Study of the Kalimantan Forest Climate Partnership (KFCP), a 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) Project, and the Effects 
on the Dayak Indonesian in Central Kalimantan, the Kapuas River Region. Halifax: Saint 
Mary's University. 
Cribb, R. (2010). Chapter 6: The reform Era 1999-Present. Retrieved July 11, 2013, from Digital 
Atlas of Indonesian History: www.indonesianhistory.info/pages/chapter-6.html 
Department of Foreign Affairs. (1997, September). Issues and Perspectives: The Philosophical 
Basis of Human Rights in Indonesia. Retrieved January 12, 2013, from Embassy of the 
Republic of Indonesia: www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/human_right-2.htm 
Dillon, D. R. (2007). The China Challenge: Standing Strong against the Military, Economic and 
Political Threats that Emperil America. Lantham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Drake, E., Malik, A., & Xu, Y. (2002). Good Governance and the World Bank. Oxford University 
Press: Nuffield College. 
Economic and Social Research Council. (2006). FInal Report: Devolution and Constitutional 
Change Programme. Retrieved March 9, 2013, from Devolution and Constitutional 
Change: www.devolution.ac.uk/final_report.html 
Faguet, J. P. (2004). Why so much Centralization? A Model of Primitive Centripetal Accumulation. 
London: London School of Economics. 
Federalist Papers. (2010). Federalist Papers: Library of Congress. Retrieved March 9, 2013, from 
Library of Congress: www.loc.gov/rr/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html 





Government of Indonesia. (1999). The Law of the Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta: Government of 
Indonesia. 
Green, K. (2005). Decentralization and good governance: The case of Indonesia. Munich: Munich 
Personal Repec Archive. 
Greenless, D. (2008, January 28). Suharto's Legacy of Development and Corruption . The New 
York Times (Asia Pacific). 
Hannan, C. (2003). General Observations. Policy Dialogue on Empowering Women in Autonomy 
and Decentralization Processes. New York: Permanent Mission of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
Hayek, F. (1948). Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. (2000). Democratization in 
Indonesia: An Assessment . Stockholm: International IDEA. 
International Monetary Fund. (2000). Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF. 
Washington: IMF. 
Lee, C. H. (2003). To Thine Ownself Be True: IMF Conditionality and Erosion of Economic 
Sovereignty in the Asian Financial Crisis. Journal of International Law, 24(4), 875-904. 
Library of Congress. (1992, November). Indonesia Country Profile. Retrieved from Nations 
Online: http://lcweb2.locgov/cgi-bin/querry/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+id0031) 
Mangkusubroto, K. (2013, July 13). Debottlenecking Indonesia's Development: An Inside Out 
Process. The Indonesian Journal of Leadership, Policy and World Affairs. 
Masters, E. (n.d.). About Indonesia: UNDP. Retrieved December 17, 2012, from United Nations 
Development Program: http://www.undp.or.id/general/about_history.asp 
McGlynn, J., & Sulistyo, H. (2005). Indonesia in Suharto Years: Issues, Incidents and Images. 
Jakarta: The Lontar Foundation. 
Mishra, S. (2012, March 1). After the Initial Big Bang of Decentralization, What Awaits Indonesia 
in the 2nd Decade? Jakarta Globe. Retrieved July 22, 2013, from 
www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive 
Mitchell, A., & Bossert, T. J. (2010). Decentralization, Governance and Health System 
performance: Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit. Development Policy Review, 
28(6), 669-691. 
Nordholt, H. S., & Van Klinken, G. (2007). The New Decentralization: 'Blossoming' Ethnic and 
Religious Conflict in Indonesia. Leiden: KILTV Press. 
100 
 
Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
O'Lincoln, T. (2009). Who's Liberty? Australian Imperialism and the Pacific War. Marxist 
Interventions, 1, 83-105. 
Ong, J. (2012, January 9). Senior Development Officer, CIDA. (M. Mercer, Interviewer) 
Pepinsky, T., & Wihardja, M. (2011). Decentralization and Economic Performance in Indonesia. 
Journal of East Asian Studies, 11(3), 337-371. 
Petras, J., & Veltmeyer, H. (2012). The Global Capitalist Crisis: Whose Crisis, Who Profits? 
International Review of Modern Sociology, 38(2), 199-219. 
Rahman, E. A. (2012, January 5). Director for Local and Economic Governance, Asia Foundation. 
(M. Mercer, Interviewer) 
Rasyid, M. R. (2002). The Policy of Decentralization in Indonesia. Atlanta: Georgia State 
University. 
Resosudarmo, B. P. (2005). The Politics and Economics of Indonesia's Natural Resources. 
Singapore: ISEAS Publications. 
Sahlins, M. (1972). Stone Age Economics. Hawthorne, New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Sato, Y. (2003). Democratizing Indonesia: Reformasi Period in Historical Perspective. Chiba: 
Institute of Developing Economies. 
Shah, A. (1999). Indonesia and Pakistan: Fiscal Decentralization - An Elusive Goal? In R. Bird, & F. 
Vaillencourt, The Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries (p. Chapter 3). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Silver, C., Azis, I., & Schroeder, L. (2001). Intergovernmental Transfers and Decentralization in 
Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(3), 345-362. 
Taleb, N. N. (2012). Antifragile: Things that Gain From Disorder. New York: Random house. 
Tanzi, V. (1996). Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and 
Macroeconomic Aspects . Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. 
The Work Bank. (2013). World Bank Data: Indonesia. Retrieved January 8, 2013, from World 
Bank Web Site: www.data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia 
The World Bank Group. (2001). Decentralization and Subnational regional Economics: Political 




Treisman, D. (2007). The Architecture of Government. Los Angeles: University of California. 
United States State Department. (2012, January 20). Background Note: Indonesia. Retrieved 
January 15, 2013, from U.S. State Department web site: 
www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/indonesia/195233.htm 
Van der Kroef, J. M. (1958). Sukarno and Hatta: The Great Debate in Indonesia. Political 
Quarterly, 29(3), 238-250. 
Washington, G. (1790, January 8). First Annual Address. Boston Independent Chronicle. 
White, R., & Smoke, P. (2005). East Asia Decentralizes: Making Local Government Work. In East 
Asia Decentralizes (pp. 1-23). Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction 




















Annex A – Research Ethics Board Certification 
 
